Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-069
Tuesday
9 April 1996

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-069 9 April 1996

CONTENTS

NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

ALBANIA

Albania: PD's Shehu Addresses Party Congress *[RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE 5 Apr]* 1

BULGARIA

Bulgaria: Videnov Rules Out Joining Yeltsin's Union *[DUMA 8 Apr]* 6
Bulgaria: Parties Form Council To Support Zhelev *[Sofia Radio]* 6
Bulgaria: Zhelev, Stoyanov Sign Agreement on Primaries *[Sofia Radio]* 6

HUNGARY

Hungary: Opinion Poll Shows Decline in Support for MDF *[NEPSZABADSAG 6 Apr]* 7
Hungary: MSZP Leadership Issues Analyzed *[MAGYARORSZAG 12 Jan]* 7
Hungary: FIDESZ's Evolution Predicted *[MAGYARORSZAG 9 Feb]* 9
Hungary: Survey Published on Readership of Dailies *[NEPSZABADSAG 27 Mar]* 11

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: Izetbegovic Interviewed on Sarajevo TV *[Sarajevo TV]* 13
B-H: PM Expects 'Major' Donations From Islamic Countries *[AFP]* 24
B-H: Muratovic, Officials Support Ruling on German Mark *[Sarajevo Radio]* 24
B-H: Herzeg-Bosnia Commission Hands Over 28 Serb POW's *[SRNA]* 25

CROATIA

Croatia: Tudjman Receives Canadian Foreign Minister *[Zagreb Radio]* 26
Croatia: 'International Terrorists' From Bosnia Arrested *[Zagreb TV]* 26

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

FYROM: Prime Minister Hails Treaty With FRY *[TANJUG]* 27
FYROM: Rumors Say Clinton To Propose Country Name *[MIC]* 27
FYROM: Liberal Party Leader Views Gligorov Role *[MIC]* 27

POLAND

Poland: Purpose of Kwasniewski's Visit to Moscow Considered *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 9 Apr]* 29
Poland: ROP Demands Report After President's Moscow Trip *[GAZETA SWIATECZNA 6-8 Apr]* 30
Poland: Daily Views Walesa's U.S. Visit, Schedule *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 5 Apr]* 30
Poland: NBP: Foreign Banks Not Allowed To Open Offices *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 6-8 Apr]* 31

ROMANIA

Romania: PD's Severin: Policy Hinders Entry Into NATO *[AZI 29 Mar]* 32
Romania: RMDSZ Chairman on Party Issues, Autonomy *[HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 6 Apr]* 32

SLOVENIA

Slovenia: Drnovsek, Party Leaders Discuss Policy on EU *[Ljubljana Radio]* 34

Slovenia: Kucan Views Yugoslav Succession, Italy *[Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 9 Apr]* . 34

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

FRY: 'Text' of Communique on Signing of FYROM Accord *[TANJUG]* 36
FRY: Kontic Satisfied With FYROM Agreement *[TANJUG]* 36
FRY: Milutinovic: Macedonia Accord To Enhance Stability *[TANJUG]* 37
FRY: Milutinovic, FYROM's Frckovski Welcome Accord *[Belgrade Radio]* 37

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic Meets Macedonian Foreign Minister *[TANJUG]* 38
Serbia: Socialist Party Hails Treaty With FYROM *[TANJUG]* 38
Serbia: Further on SPS Comment on Treaty With FYROM *[TANJUG]* 38
Serbia: Tasks of Economic Chamber President Viewed *[NIN 16 Feb]* 38

Montenegro

Montenegro: Djukanovic on Dissatisfaction With Federation *[FONET 8 Apr]* 40
Montenegro: Disputes With Serbia Over Airports Viewed *[MONITOR 23 Feb]* 40
Montenegro: Party Official on Investigation of Kidnappings *[VREME 2 Mar]* 42

Albania: PD's Shehu Addresses Party Congress

AU0504200596 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 5 Apr 96 pp 1-2

[Address by PD Chairman Tritan Shehu to the Third National Congress in Tirana on 4 April: "The Democratic Party Alternative—The Alternative of the Future"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This congress is no doubt the most important event in Albanian political life today, not only because this is the highest organ of the Democratic Party [PD], but because we are gathered here today to analyze what we have achieved in these four years of democracy and to determine the main guidelines for the development of the PD and the country in the next electoral period.

Assurance of Another Four-Year Mandate for the PD Government

This congress meets at a very special political moment, because it is being held on the threshold of an election campaign that will no doubt result in another four-year mandate for the PD government. Moreover, this congress is meeting immediately after the dissolution of the Albanian parliament, which, during its four years of work with a PD majority, laid the judicial basis of the rule of law, the market economy, respect for human rights, and integration in Europe for the first time in Albania's history.

The role of the PD in these historic changes has been decisive since the first day of its foundation. Our party was built on the aspirations for democracy of students, lecturers, intellectuals, working people, peasants, and former victims of political persecution, who overthrew the most savage dictatorship in Europe, laid the foundations of a democracy, and, in four years, not only succeeded in extracting Albania from a state of total economic, political, and social collapse, but achieved very positive developments in every field and laid sound foundations for the future.

The PD has therefore succeeded in identifying itself as the party of the future, thanks both to what it has achieved and what it promises. It has succeeded in this because it has made a reality out of the aspirations of everybody, and our victory will therefore again be the victory of all. The PD also succeeded in identifying itself as the party of Europe, not only because it integrated itself completely into the structures of European politics, but because it is the locomotive drawing Albania toward Europe, that destination toward which Albanians have aspired for centuries.

During this period, we cultivated these values and made them a reality, proving that we are the sole alternative able to realize our aspirations for economic development, the evolution of democracy, and increased prosperity. Only this alternative will enable us to continue on the road on which we embarked, a road that the democrats of Europe have traversed before us.

Albania has no need of experiments and now recognizes its future. It is important for it to continue in this direction. Any experiment, any change of alternative, would, without any doubt, be accompanied by very harmful consequences, more waste of time, and unnecessary sacrifices. Experiments were conducted on us for 50 years, and their results are clear to everybody. It is vital today to say no to them, and to say yes to development.

The PD Needs Everybody Who Aspires to Democracy and Progress

In order to secure this, the PD needs everybody who aspires to democracy and progress.

The PD needs its founders, those who were the first to rise up and make sacrifices, who fought against the dictatorships, and who rotted in prisons and camps, but the PD also needs those who joined us in 1992 and later and those who will vote for us for the first time in 1996.

It needs them because Albania needs a strong PD in a majority. It is precisely in order to achieve this that the PD remains true to two elements that are vital for it: respect for internal democracy and determination to remain an open party. It has demonstrated in every situation that it is determined to cling fanatically to democratic principles.

It is important to say that the PD has been able to confront several difficult situations that have arisen only by remaining true to these democratic principles and trying to solve them through people's free votes, the extensive participation of its membership, and with openness. This constitutes our strength and is our assurance for the future. This has been our essential principle throughout this period.

There have been moments when certain elements have, with various intentions, tried to give the PD the appearance of a force of extreme revanchism and have tried to isolate, reduce, and hedge it in. We told them from the start: You have nothing in common with us. Go away and create your own party! Those who called themselves fascists wanted to introduce into our party the old disease of biographies, to narrow the PD's social base, to alienate intellectuals and people of value. There came a time when the PD of Tirana shrank to 3,000 members, some of them only on paper. However, everything was quickly corrected, because we remained true to democratic principles and to the concept of an

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

open party. We succeeded in preserving and strengthening the broad social basis on which the PD is built, as the only guarantee for victory and for the future.

The PD is a party striving for a majority of the electorate. It therefore considers sacred its broad social base, formed by various social strata and groups with diverse interests, but who all aspire for democracy, a market economy, and entry into Europe. This has always distinguished us from those small parties struggling for 8 to 10 percent of the electorate. We must be aware that herein lies the guarantee for preventing communism from returning to power. It is this that makes the PD able to grow and to attract honest people of reputation and substance, now and in the future. This is why the PD Tirana Brach now has about 16,000 members and the entire PD has about 130,000 effective members in about 3,500 sections nationwide.

Our statute describes one of the keys to victory. It states that the PD accepts anybody who accepts our program, except for those who come from the Red nomenklatura or who have committed crimes.

It is this clause that dissociates us entirely from the past. It is also this clause that sanctions our broad social basis and our faith in people, their ability to change, and their personal work. It is this clause that gives us the scope for victory.

It is precisely this faith in the individual and respect for democratic foundations that the PD manifested in its decision to hold a referendum and in its subsequent efforts for the draft constitution.

We were all aware of a risk, especially in the knowledge that this referendum was being held in the middle of the electoral term, when the social cost of the reforms was very high. However, we were also aware that there was no other way of giving the country a constitution and to fulfilling the item on our program that states that the PD will make every effort to approve the constitution. We had no other chance because the communist opposition, already organized into an as yet undeclared Red front, sought at all costs to use the constitution as a tool to blockade the work of the parliament and to bring the country to early elections, a fixation of theirs since 23 March 1992. We did not win the referendum, but, on the other hand, we demonstrated, just as we did in the local elections, that we respect and fight for all the rules of democracy.

The referendum defeat, on the other hand, brought to light many failings in the PD, especially in its organization. Our low-level organizations and sections did not succeed in taking an active part in the political struggle and explaining to people what had been achieved in those years. In politics, it is not enough to take action: You must also explain what you have done. For our part, we had not understood the profound change in people's mentalities that had taken place in the previous two years, a change that was reflected in an abandonment of collectivist ideas and the crystallization of the idea of the free individual as the basis of Albanian society, or the creation of many small social groups with diverse interests, in other words a marked social fragmentation in Albania. We did not manage to reflect this in our explicatory work and the broad dialogue that small party structures should have conducted with the electorate. Moreover, the absurd blow that some PD structures struck against the government or other state elements of the PD created a paradoxical situation that could have caused serious damage.

All these things created a difficult situation, which was exacerbated by some unsuitable standpoints defended at that time that led to some policies that were not at all in the interests of the PD and alternatives that coincided entirely with those of our opponents. This posed the danger of letting the political initiative pass to them. There were also many undemocratic demands that were analyzed at length at our Extraordinary National Conference. We succeeded in overcoming this situation by again honoring democratic principles, setting the entire party in motion, and respecting a free ballot.

It was these principles that made it possible to achieve and secure a significant improvement in the quality of the PD management structures, and their renewal, in the elections in our branches last year. Renewal was and will remain one of our goals. Renewal is a demand of the times and of development. It relies on qualitative improvement. To carry out this in an open and democratic fashion means to confirm the future of the party and its alternative and to experience democracy.

In a short time, we succeeded in making significant qualitative improvements. As expected, this led to a growth in the size of the PD and a significant improvement in its work, especially at the grass roots. Qualitative renewal is a vital and dynamic process especially at periods of vigorous change such as the one our country is experiencing now, and is a process that consolidates the future. The most important feats that we have achieved, but which still remain future objectives, included improving the intellectual calibre of members, lowering their average age, and securing a greater participation of women in our structures. It is vital to move in step with the times. Our present stage of development no doubt calls for greater professionalism, knowledge, skill, and wisdom. We are realizing these

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

things, and projecting the future. This is why the PD will remain the party of the future.

The PD is what it is because, since its creation, it has aimed its work not only at bringing the country out of its state of total collapse, not only at confronting the emergency situation, but at projecting the future. In our program during our very first days during that time of communist terror, conflict, and insecurity, we produced our first optimistic alternative and outlined our first paths of development.

Our government has clearly demonstrated this tendency. Its main concern, evident in its first decrees and laws, was to emerge from the serious crisis on one hand and to create the future on the other. It was these brave decisions, which some called hasty and premature, that formed the basis for the construction of the rule of law, the market economy, free initiative, a move toward Europe, and above all the prosperity of the free individual. We showed clearly that our victory was not merely that of the PD, but of everybody. This was because everybody lived better and aimed higher.

The PD—Party of the Future

The things we did laid plans for development. Our vision was then and still is to continually improve peoples lives. This is the basis of our society, and this will be the basis for our program in the next four years. Our program once again aims at fast economic development, further integration in international structures, and the refinement of democratic institutions, and has at its basis improving everybodys social and economic level. We therefore say that our victory belongs to all Albanians, and that it is a victory for development and for the future.

Being a party of the future, the PD is also the party of Europe. We thank the European Christian Democratic Union and the European Democratic Union for the appreciation they have shown to the PD by admitting it as a member to these two very important European democratic structures. This is no doubt a reward for our work and a form of appreciation of what we have done and what we are doing. It also confirms our fully European orientation, this aspiration of the Albanian people. Moreover, in thanking all the democratic European political forces for the support they have given us and their continual help, I want to assure them that the PD is and will remain the party of Europe. Albania needs a PD of this kind, in order to realize our national aspirations, which must be put on the road toward a solution as soon as possible. We are determined to respect democratic ways and means for this.

The Socialist Party Congress—The Congress That Turned Back

We have a very great responsibility to the country today. This is not only because we won the votes of 65 percent of the Albanians, but because we are faced with one of the most regressive and conservative alternatives in Europe, an alternative of antivalues, antiprosperity, isolation, xenophobia, and the diktat of the extreme left. A few days ago, the anti-PD, anti-Berisha, nihilistic alternative made itself appallingly clear at its congress, of which nobody can say whether it was the first, the second, or the twelfth.

Like these people's entire alternative, this congress was one of antivalues, a denial of everything that has been achieved, and, to judge by its decisions, might be called the congress of turning back [reference to the Albanian Workers Party Ninth Congress in 1986, the congress of continuity].

Its basic idea was Marxist continuity and an opposition to every tendency of renewal or dissociation form the past. The partys group of leaders, Nano, Ruci, Dokle, and Pellumbi, linked by hundreds of ties to the past and unable to free themselves from them, are trying to keep the entire Socialist Party [PS] in a Red backwater. Fear of renewal was clearly evident in the Byzantine conduct of this congress, its organization in two phases at an interval of several months, its lack of elections, and its voting for a phantom-list of candidates as deputies. This happened because the party includes in perilous coexistence some who believe in the ideals of European social democracy and who are unincriminated by the past, and many segments of the former secret police, people who are nostalgic for the past, and those whose ties with the past are indissoluble because of their complicity in crime. It is these later who dominate and direct this increasingly aggressive party today.

It is idle to think that these fundamentalists can be reformed. The last few years have shown that those who changed the partys name overnight to the Socialist Party by a Politburo decisions, who do not respect the most elementary rules of internal democracy, and who insult and attack European countries and the United States will never be able to carry Albania forward.

Before asking for power and seeking support from democratic forces at home and abroad, this party must openly and seriously undergo a thorough process of renewal.

First, this party must renew itself by dissociating itself from the past, from Marxism and Marxists, from Enverism and Enverists, and must shed its regressive tendencies. It must make its mark with concrete political

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

acts in European organizations foreign policy, and must attempt to direct the reform at home and the countrys progress toward Europe. There is every sign that such a political force will find these things a remote political goal.

The Red front that they have recently created thoroughly confirms this. At the basis of their policies lies the concept of a mixed economy with the domination of the state over the economy of the market, a blockade against personal enrichment, and the repeal of democratic laws. They have sought two-thirds of the parliament, because their real goal has been and remains a Red dictatorship. The danger arising from this is the creation of a new left-wing totalitarianism, whose evolution, if it is established, will be totally unpredictable.

Their current appeals, "With us for genuine democracy," resemble the shouts of an arsonist calling for the fire brigade. This is the party that, in the name of Marxism, cultivated the class war and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and imposed dictatorship and isolation for 50 years. These are the same people who, in 1990 and 1991, supported Ramiz Alia when he said We will shed blood and eat grass, but will never allow pluralism and the market economy. They are same people who acted on this summons in February 1991, on 2 April 1991, and on the threshold of the 1992 elections, after having shed so much blood and causing so many tears throughout their existence. Today, as one listens to these screams for democracy, they seem to come from the mouth of Marx, who takes the main place in their program. It is tragic and comic to look for democracy through Marx and Enver. They ask for democracy when pluralism and the market economy have been consolidated in Albania, when Albania is a member of the Council of Europe, and when the PD is part of European structures. They ask for democracy when they voted against the Law on Human Rights. This is the demand of the leaders of the PS, the Democratic Alliance, and the Social Democratic Party, i.e. the Red front. This the demand of those who held out against democracy to the last, who tried to eliminate the first shoots of democracy, and who appeared on the new political stage as the final excrement of the dictatorship.

The PS's Alternative—The Establishment of the Diktat of the Red Front

Their real goal is different, and is connected with their indoctrination in the past. Their real goal is to establish the diktat of the Red front and to recycle their crimes, creating a new-style isolation, and slackening the pace of the reforms, i.e. the rate of development.

However, this is only their utopia. The truth is that they are in deep crisis, a crisis of lost identity.

They have not reformed, because nobody pays any attention to the reformers in their midst, and there is a danger of these reformers not being considered as such.

Yet they do not want to be called conservatives, which is what the partys leaders really are.

So what are they?

They are nothing but those that time forgot. Their party has survived like a fossil from the past, abandoned by developments, one of the most conservative forces in Europe, just as it once represented the most criminal regime. This party is now disintegrating. The second phase of their congress will testify to this. It is therefore the duty of all those who believe in genuine social democracy to conclusively dissociate themselves from segments of the past, cutting themselves loose and breathing freely. This is their duty, because Albania needs a reformed, European-style left.

For its part, the PD, as an open party, wishes to cooperate with all those other political forces that are genuinely to the right of the center, barring extremes. Being aware that we are the main political force and the majority party, we also acknowledge the need for cooperation with those political parties that struggle for democratic principles. We do not see this as away of seizing a few bubbles. It is a duty to democracy, performed on the basis of freedom and out of respect for one another.

We have therefore been open to coalitions since 1992, although we possessed 65 percent of the parliament. We are now open to cooperation before the elections, and are positively inclined to coalitions after the elections with other parties, and think that this is a positive element in democracy.

The elections are approaching, and everything indicates a new victory for us of the same dimensions as in 1992. This is because we kept our promises, and carried out our contract with the electorate. We therefore have the right to ask for the signature on a new contract. There have been great changes. Without doubt, mistakes have also been made, mainly because of the position from which we started and our lack of experience in active political life when we embarked on this road. However, the important thing is that we correct and learn from these mistakes as we go. The next four-year period will doubtless be easier, development will be faster, economic growth higher, and our entry into Europe more assured. However, this requires the victory of our alternative, as the sole safe and tested option. We ask for this victory not only because our alternative has shown what we can do, because we look to the future. This is because the PD itself, in its mission, its program, and

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

its achievements, is the party of the future. Any other experiment would have harmful consequences.

The victory depends on us, on our work, our organization, and our broad social basis. Without strong structures and strong branches, and without broad dialogue with the electorate in every home, in every family, and with every individual, there can be no victory!

The main basis of the future campaign will be small-scale work with people, and extensive and continual dialogue. This calls for organization, dedication, and the mobilization of tens of thousands of activists nationwide. Their work, growing and reaching its culmination on the election day, will assure our victory. We possess the capacities. We have our organization, our people, and our optimistic alternative for the future. Therefore we will win.

Victory is ours because we also possess the central figure in the campaign. To head the campaign, we have the most respected figure with the best reputation, who has the most credit for our achievements so far, and who has led the PD since its creation. We have our president, Mr. Sali Berisha.

We will win because, with us, everybody wins.

Long live the PD.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Bulgaria: Videnov Rules Out Joining Yeltsin's Union

AU0804162996 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 8 Apr 96 p 1

[Article by Ani Kostova: "Videnov: Bulgarian Foreign Policy Supports Participation in a United Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bulgaria wants to take part in a united Europe and has never raised the question of joining other integrational groups, including the recently announced four-country one, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov declared in Burgas. In his view, it is wrong to mention Bulgaria in this context. A reaction from the Bulgaria side was only to be expected, Videnov added, and stressed that it is unacceptable for the opposition to utilize this international issue for obvious and very cynical election campaign purposes.

In the prime minister's opinion, the Bulgarian president should have learned that the country's foreign policy is not made on the basis of putches and false velvet revolutions, let alone ceaseless scandals.

It is our country's right to continue our efforts to clearly define its positions versus Russia by handing over an official note in Moscow on 8 April, Videnov added. He added that it was the Russian ambassador's right to accept or refuse the note handed to him.

Bulgaria: Parties Form Council To Support Zhelev

AU0804172196 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 8 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today the parties supporting Zhelyu Zhelev as a presidential candidate formed a public political council. The council will be composed of the leaders of the 11 parties and associations that have nominated the president for a second term in office. The council will determine its statute at its next meeting. Its main purpose is to agree on joint actions to support Zhelyu Zhelev both during the primary elections to be fought between the two opposition candidates and during the actual presidential elections.

Zhelyu Zhelev is likely to sign an agreement on taking part in the primaries to select a single common opposition candidate, Aleksandur Pramatarski of the Democratic Party announced after meeting with the president today. However, some of the party representatives who attended the meeting expressed reservations regarding the idea of holding primaries.

President Zhelev's talks with the extraparliamentary political forces fall outside the context of his preliminary intentions to conduct a tolerant campaign prior to the internal opposition elections. This statement was made today by SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] leader Ivan Kostov at a meeting with correspondents in Stara Zagora. According to Ilko Gruev, correspondent of Radio Stara Zagora, Kostov arrived in the town late this afternoon to take part in an expanded council meeting of the regional SDS organization called to discuss the organization and holding of primary elections to select a presidential candidate.

Bulgaria: Zhelev, Stoyanov Sign Agreement on Primaries

AU0904095096 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 9 Apr 96

[Report by Mariya Tsankova from the Presidency Building in Sofia—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today, President Zhelyu Zhelev and Petur Stoyanov signed the agreement for the opposition presidential primaries according to all the official rules. An agreement takes effect when it becomes a platform, commented Anastasiya Mozer, cochairman of the People's Union. The two candidates agreed that their platform will be based on tolerance, and the common motif is a single candidate to represent the democratic community who is capable of winning the actual presidential elections. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Hungary: Opinion Poll Shows Decline in Support for MDF

AU0904114696 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 6 Apr 96 p 4

[Unattributed report on opinion poll on popularity of political parties in Hungary carried out by Szonda Ipsos Institute between 6 and 16 March 1996: "Support for MDF at Bottom"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP] continues to head the list of Hungarian political parties' popularity and, this time, support for both parties is essentially identical. The Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] is the loser in the month of March.

The bloc of MDF supporters has never been so small as today since the latest parliamentary elections: only 3 percent of the electorate support them. This can be regarded as the most interesting result of the latest Szonda Ipsos national political opinion poll carried out in March.

To analyze the figures, it is important to know that most interviews took place in the first half of March, so the FKGP general meeting, Torgyan's speech and its reverberations did not affect the answers. Changes worth mentioning took place in the support shown for two parties: Support for both the MDF and the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] dropped by 2 percent. Although these changes are not really serious from a statistical point of view, they nevertheless make a difference in the case of the MDF. Opinion polls carried out so far show that the MDF would have definitely made it into Parliament, but the current results of the MDF would make this questionable today. At present, the MDF has a 5-percent base among the voters; with this result, the MDF achieved the worst figure in the past 18 months and the MDF is also in the worst position among the six political parties represented in Parliament. So far, the Hungarian Democratic People's Party [MDNP]—a party formed by former MDF deputies in Parliament—has been able to achieve the support of 1 percent of the voters. Another interesting aspect of the opinion poll carried out in the mid-March is that both the camp of MSZP and FKGP supporters and the camp of MSZP and FKGP opponents are identical in size. The month of March represented a negative peak for the FKGP: 21 percent of the voters declared that they would not vote for the FKGP in any case. The MSZP headed the list of antipathy in the past year, and the FKGP has now "joined" it. This is the first time that the proportion of uncertain voters exceeded 40 percent. This political attitude is even more widespread than the average among those who lack basic education [47 percent]. Distance from politics characterizes the elderly and women [43 percent].

Which party would you vote for if elections were held today?

	People Interviewed	People Expressing a Party Preference
	Percent	
MSZP	16	26
SZDSZ	8	13
MDF	3	5
FKGP	16	28
KDNP	4	7
FIDESZ	8	13
Workers Party	1	2
Entrepreneurs Party	1	2
MIEP	1	2
MDNP	1	1
Other parties	1	1
Would not vote	41	

Hungary: MSZP Leadership Issues Analyzed

96CH0037A Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 12 Jan 96 p 11

[Article by Laszlo Keri and Istvan Stumpf: "Socialists at the Halfway Point"; Part III of "Panoramic View of the Political Parties"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Beyond all these things, in 1996 they will remain captives of the "Horn problem," and a majority of them will relate to this issue in an odd way. They grumble on the one hand, and believe that the fact that their chairman is unfit to serve as prime minister is the cause of every fiasco and loss of popularity; on the other hand, the same voices, the same persons cannot even perceive that another person could be fit to shake up and to put in order this multicolored party in the last moment.*

A genre painting from last year's MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] congress in Miskolc: Everyone is happy and everyone is satisfied as well as dissatisfied. Attentive analysts of speeches delivered by key personalities were able to find traces of a variety of colors, which also accurately revealed calmness before the storm. They disclosed everything, passed judgment on everything—

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

and postponed everything. Let us see what happens in March, they said. An outside observer gets the feeling that this kind of performance by the MSZP could serve as a model. It serves as an example for how to face every issue, while escaping the constraint of rendering decisions.

The MSZP, however, is hardly in a position to take risks, because, as of the mid-1990's, it is Hungary's ruling party in the midst of an economic crisis and at the halftime of newly evolving foreign policy orientations. It is Hungary's ruling party in the thick of redistribution systems involving hundreds of billions, when decisions are made for several generations as to who will be rich and who will be poor. It is Hungary's ruling party, which has once already let go of its power. (Once upon a time the MSZP was brought to believe that it, too, must sing the new, multiparty march of democracy, and by the time it finished singing the song, it found out that instead of power, it only held on to a single carnation stem.)

Within the MSZP, both leaders and members are aware of what it means to be in the opposition, what happens when a party begins to fall apart, and of the consequences of being at the periphery of power. For this reason, the existential foundation for the aforementioned, rather disturbing duality cannot cease until those, who are no longer depressed by the indelible experience of the past downfall, become the majority.

Notwithstanding the above, the past year and a half—and perhaps even the years thereafter—has, as a rule, been dominated by two-faced conduct. There was hardly any time left to rejoice over the unexpected, large-scale victory, before they were forced to realize that it would not at all be possible to govern according to their own intentions and principles, and that they could govern only in a manner responsive to constraints. In the wake of these new recognitions, fault lines of the existing internal dissection came into increasingly sharper focus, of course. Differences of opinion and disputes are on the increase, and opposing interests are revealed sooner or later. All these things are part of the normal process after all, but the new developments strongly divide the voter constituency that provided the background for victory.

The MSZP has come a long way from the status of being a party that had suffered the largest defeat in the 1990 elections, to landslide victory four years later. By no coincidence perhaps, and not unlike the Smallholders [Independent Smallholders Party, FKGP], the Socialists, too, had to resolve the leadership crisis within their party first. Not unlike Jozsef Torgyan, Gyula Horn, who had played a key role in crisis management while consolidating his party, had accumulated power of such magnitude during the consolidation period that his power increased further during the election campaign. [While the MSZP was not in power,] rival political parties were able to hold the Socialists with their 33 parliamentary mandates in quarantine for a long time. The restrained, professional conduct manifested by the Socialists in parliament, however, increased their legitimacy slowly, and by playing an active role in establishing the Democratic Charta, adverse feelings toward the MSZP harbored by the socioliberal intelligentsia began to relax. By 1994 the MSZP was not only able to retain an overwhelming majority of its regular voters, but was also able to attract a significant number of new voters. At the same time, it is also true that the large number of voters who suddenly fell in love with the MSZP were motivated primarily by an intent to get rid of the Antall government. Thus, from the standpoint of background, MSZP supporters became an extremely heterogeneous group. On the one hand, two-thirds of those who voted for the MSZP were independent ["wandering"] voters, [who declared themselves before the elections to be] uncertain as to which party they would vote for. On the other hand, the party could count on the sympathy of those who, as of 1994, had either won or lost as a result of the system change. Pronounced counterpoles evolved among supporters, and increased expectations related to the new government served as precursors of conflicts within the party and within the group of representatives seated in parliament.

Considering all this, it comes as no surprise that during the past year and a half the MSZP has lost more than half of its 1994 electorate, and that those who would, under any circumstances, be loyal to the party presently constitute more than 80 percent of the MSZP's voter base. The most characteristic attribute of those who stick with the MSZP is that they would most certainly cast votes in a possible election (unlike the suddenly increased constituency of the Smallholders).

The Socialists suffered sensitive losses (10 percentage points) among holders of diplomas and people in leading positions. In this category, the MSZP's advantage was significantly reduced as compared to the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] and FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats], even though the Socialists remain most popular among these people. The Smallholders managed to lure away the bulk of the large number of young voters that once supported the MSZP, and by now the MSZP has only half the number of supporters between the ages of 18 and 33, than what FIDESZ has.

Upon reexamining the social composition of the voter base we could say that the defenseless strata—the unemployed, retirees, and young, skilled workers—had turned away from the Socialists in greater proportions than

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

those holding leading positions and the better educated. According to most recent public opinion poll results, the FKGP and the MSZP are engaged in the intensified struggle for the votes of the defenseless. (If an election were held today, the ratio of the Smallholders' victory over the MSZP would be 33:18; a year ago the same ratio was 47:4 in favor of the Socialists....)

The MSZP will remain a constant and fruitful subject for analysts, journalists, opponents, and sympathizers for some time to come. It seems as if something of an essential nature could happen within that party at any time. People will continue guessing whether the parliamentary group is going to break up, whether large-scale changes in the composition of the executive committee of the party's board is going to occur, and who are going to be the next ministers, and which minister are going to depart next. The party's elite will continue to manifest eternal tension, and there always will be groups to be identified by important names, which will voice their actual dissatisfaction. We will have to regard all these phenomena as natural political developments, insofar as constant tension must, by necessity, exist in a party which goes this far in its endeavors to include within a single political framework mutually contradictory value systems, promises, and endeavors.

Beyond all these things, in 1996 they will remain captives of the "Horn problem," and a majority of them will relate to this issue in an odd way. They grumble on the one hand, and believe that the fact that their chairman is unfit to serve as prime minister is the cause of every fiasco and loss of popularity; on the other hand, the same voices, the same persons cannot even perceive that another person could be fit to shake up and to put in order this multicolored party in the last moment, even if nothing more is to be accomplished than surviving one or another crisis period.

The two opposite mass sentiments have been in balance for two years, sometimes even within certain individuals. And the big question is this: What kinds of responses will this year's challenges evoke from determinative groups within the MSZP and will the scale tilt in one or another direction as a result of these responses? If it tilts, we can be sure that a new era for Socialists begins.

Hungary: FIDESZ's Evolution Predicted

96CH0054C Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 9 Feb 96 p 11

[Article by Laszlo Keri and Istvan Stumpf: "FIDESZ on the Bumpy Road Toward the Civic Mainstream"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Young Democrats exploded like a comet into Hungarian politics. Modern political history hardly knows of another party that set an age ceiling of 35 for its members and then went on to play a significant role in parliamentary democracy. The voters sent FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] to the first parliament after the political system's change, as the pronounced representative of a new, young, post-communist generation. At the time it seemed that this young generation would be able to bring politics closer to the people, and to make the administration of public affairs more transparent, colorful and appealing, even to the younger generations. By acting pragmatically and professionally in parliament, by cautiously distancing themselves from ideological debate, and with their least party-like characteristics, the young MP's as a team grew into the success story of the period between the two elections. Their popularity shot up to an all-time high, and they became the darlings of the opinionmaking intellectuals and the media. It seemed that the new political generation might get a determining role in Hungary at the turn of the millennium. The party's leaders realized that the great popularity was ephemeral, and that approval ratings could not be converted directly into votes. Nevertheless, the interest that domestic and foreign influential circles were showing in them led the Young Democrats to believe that they might play an important role in determining the composition of the next government. In the spirit of preparing for a role in government, they rescinded the age ceiling for members, broadened their base of experts, and concerned themselves ever more with the questions of gaining supreme power. By resisting the strategic objectives of the Democratic Charter that urged uniting the opposition, they aroused the suspicion of also the media elite that had been sympathizing with them earlier.

FIDESZ was preparing for an independent political role and did not necessarily want to play according to the scenario of status quo elite that wielded decisive influence within Hungarian society. But the Young Democrats lacked sufficient intellectual influence to present a credible political alternative. Especially conspicuous was their lack of economic potential and of a networking system. And their unsuccessful attempts to create an economic base of their own (the matter of their party headquarters, the founding of businesses) shook one of their assets considered to be of greatest

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

importance: their moral capital, the firm belief in their being different. The debates on strategy brought to the surface the internal fault lines (the resignation of Fodor and his associates) in the team that earlier had been thought to be homogeneous. For generational reasons, FIDESZ's embedment in society was very weak, and the youngest generations constituted a substantial proportion of its base of support. For a long time the Young Democrats were able to turn to their advantage the fact that they did not belong among the clients of any of the large social elites, and therefore they did not have to conform in their political actions to the expectations of such interest groups. But as the elections approached, the traits that earlier had been considered advantageous turned into drawbacks.

Abandoning its pragmatic, professional approach to problems, the party leadership entered into a religious war of an ideological nature, and too much emphasis on negative campaigning lost the party its appeal even to young voters. The status quo elite saw in FIDESZ's successes a threat to positions the elite had managed to gain for itself up to then. With the help of the media, therefore, it had an interest in presenting to the public, with as much emphasis as possible, the mistakes the young party leadership had actually made. FIDESZ was unable to repeat its uniquely witty and colorful election campaign of four years earlier, and its messages to the electorate canceled each other out. It was unable to gain especially its young voters' acceptance and understanding of what was behind its radical anticommunist criticism—namely, the prevention of the old elite's return. Voters interpreted the more lenient criticism of the conservative government as an attempt by the Young Democrats to extend the life of a government that had already fallen. The ideology-based skirmishing that replaced the party's rational reasoning raised doubts even within the base of young experts who sympathized with FIDESZ. No wonder then, that the party's showing in the 1994 parliamentary elections was even worse than had been expected. Besides the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum], FIDESZ was the other big loser in the elections, regardless of the fact that it lost only two seats. As the smallest party with its 20 seats, the only political force that has not yet shouldered government responsibility, it had to sit in the opposition benches once again. A generational breakthrough did not occur. At the controls of supreme power, the "historical" generation was replaced by the 1968 "great" generation's wing dominated by technocrats.

During the past 18 months, FIDESZ's base of support has undergone significant changes. Among decided voters, FIDESZ has doubled the number of its supporters (according to the latest, January, poll conducted by Szonda Ipsos, FIDESZ's support in this category is 13 percent). As opposed to the experience of the past parliamentary cycle, support for the Young Democrats has not shown a sudden, sharp jump. Rather, what we can speak of is more of a slow but continuous rise. According to the latest figures, through this persistent slow advance the Young Democrats have caught up, in terms of support, with their erstwhile ally/competitor, the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats]. Last year FIDESZ recaptured its lead among the youngest age groups. The contest with the FKGP [Independent Smallholders' Party], to win sympathizers among youths with low educational levels, intensified last year. Because of FIDESZ's moderate tone in its political appearances, however, the odds seem to favor the Smallholders. The contest with the SZDSZ is for winning the support of two strata in particular. FIDESZ is gradually winning over the better educated sympathizers from the SZDSZ, while the latter appears to be the more successful in winning support among the intellectual elite. On the other hand, FIDESZ appeared the more successful during the past period in winning over the better educated voters abandoning the MDF. An indication of the general rise of empathy with the Young Democrats is also the fact that for many months the party has been holding its lead among the second-preference parties, as well as in the contest for the most appealing party. FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party has succeeded in easing its generational characteristics; so far as the age of its sympathizers is concerned, the party's base of support is substantially better balanced than it was earlier, although more than half of its supporters are under 33 even so. The contest with the Smallholders is for winning over not just youths, but provincial entrepreneurs as well. FIDESZ has been able to make significant progress especially among the better educated entrepreneurs. The most conspicuous change in FIDESZ's base of support is that it is substantially more stable than before. It can be established from available research data that, after the Smallholders and the KDNP [Christian Democratic People's Party], FIDESZ has the greatest voter-retention ability—i.e., a substantial proportion of the voters who supported the party in 1994 have remained loyal to it. At the same time, defectors from the SZDSZ, MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] and the MDF also account for a substantial proportion of the party's base of support. Although the Young Democrats have increased their influence among decided voters, the party remains at odds with its supporters over their propensity to vote. In other words, the Young Democrats have within their camp the fewest supporters who now could be counted on to turn out to vote on a Sunday.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Among the opposition parties, FIDESZ was the first to realize that only a coordinated opposition strategy would have any chance against the parties that form the present ruling coalition. The bill amending the Local Elections Law, which the ruling parties pushed through at the very last minute, was a kind of external compulsion for cooperation among the opposition parties. The initial successes of joint actions encouraged the leaderships of the parties to find as soon as possible also an organizational framework for the elaboration of joint opposition strategy. But only FIDESZ and an overwhelming majority of the MDF were able to identify politically with the opportunities inherent in the Civic Alliance. From the very beginning, the chairman of the FKGP could imagine cooperation among the opposition parties only within the framework of a political alliance that he dominated. And the new leadership of the KDNP started out from the principle that, within the polarizing opposition, the Christian Democratic Party could becoming the integrating point, by virtue of its traditions. The situation upgraded the importance of the KDNP, and in the end it decided to refrain for the time being from participation in forming the Civic Alliance. The debate on strategies for the opposition's cooperation accelerated within the MDF in the processes of polarization that culminated in the choosing of candidates for the presidential elections in March.

FIDESZ wanted to clearly indicate also by the expansion of its name, as well as by its new program, that it would like to become the party of the civic mainstream. Those who found the Young Democrat's shift to the right, and toward more nationalism, on the progressive-liberal palette have already left the party or, as voters, have withdrawn their support from it. FIDESZ does not appear to be divided by disputes over orientation, and it seems a relatively homogeneous formation also in terms of party identity. The possibility of program-based, professional politics has been restored. The party's embedment in the economy has not become stronger. As a result, the party has been left out of deals that are open to suspicions of corruption and are arousing very strong public indignation these days. The party's intellectual base has broadened, and it has a good chance of changing the earlier generational barriers into generational opportunities. In a social sense, it will be able to support restoration of the "contract between generations" that is out of balance. And politically the party can undertake to promote the demand for the pluralization of power on a generational basis, against the elite structures that are becoming increasingly closed. All this requires setting aside the confront-and-divide strategies and tactics that have been employed with varying success in the past, and placing greater emphasis on the party's integrating role and cooperating behavior.

Hungary: Survey Published on Readership of Dailies

AU2703192096 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 27 Mar 96 pp 1, 9

[Interview with Adam Levendel, director of the Szonda Ipsos company, by Lajos Pogonyi; place and date not given: "The Newspaper Market or the Fight for Readers"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Together with the GFK-Hungaria Market Research Institute, the Szonda Ipsos public opinion research company has prepared a second study called "Media Analysis," containing data gathered on the use of domestic media. We interviewed Adam Levendel, director of the Szonda Ipsos, concerning this. [passage omitted]

[Pogonyi] Szonda Ipsos has just published its latest media analysis, which deals, among other things, with readership changes in the national dailies and changes in the Hungarian newspaper market in the past one or two years.

[Levendel] Together with the GFK-Hungaria Market Research Institute, Szonda Ipsos has prepared the study called "Media Analysis" for the second year. The goal of the two institutions' continuous surveys is to collect data on the use of the media in Hungary. We want reliable and unbiased data which, as an accepted standard, can serve as a basis for comparison and as a working tool for all participants of the media market. [passage omitted]

[Pogonyi] How do you think the printed press market and, within this, NEPSZABADSAG's position, has changed in the past years?

[Levendel] Almost 2 million people read dailies in Hungary and almost half of these read NEPSZABADSAG. Therefore, on the national daily market, NEPSZABADSAG's readership is as big as that of all the others together.

[Pogonyi] What major changes have taken place in the Hungarian media market in the past years?

[Levendel] Parallel with the change in regime, privatization and spontaneous privatization changes took place in the printed press, which means that it is not the task of the media law to change ownership conditions, while a large section of the electronic media still faces privatization. The printed press gained much from the commotion in the electronic media. The privatization process of the printed press was accompanied by an advertising income possibility greater than the European average. However, the privatization of the electronic media will take a big slice out of advertising. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Pogonyi] Let us return to NEPSZABADSAG. Your survey shows that almost 914,000 people read it. Formerly the slogan was "Over 1 million people want to read it."

[Levendel] Amidst the economic decline, the processes of the Hungarian media market are unfavorable for the printed press. Paper and, consequently, newspaper prices have increased to such an extent that the dailies' number of printed copies has decreased everywhere in Europe in the past 10 years. Therefore in talking about NEPSZABADSAG having continued to lose its readership, even after 1989, I must say that this paper has kept a rather strong position. In the market of papers other than tabloids, NEPSZABADSAG's readership decreased by relatively less than that of other newspapers, and therefore, in this sense, its position is stronger now than five years ago. [passage omitted]

[Pogonyi] What is NEPSZABADSAG's most typical characteristic in the printed press?

[Levendel] Very few newspapers exists whose readership, size, and structure are similar to the audience of the electronic media. The readers of all dailies are highly qualified people in the center, and a dominance in male readers tends to be typical. However, the main characteristic of NEPSZABADSAG's readership is that is does not have special characteristics: NEPSZABADSAG's readership structure approaches the proportions typical of adult society to the largest extent.

Readership of National Dailies

NEPSZABADSAG	914,000
BLIKK	386,000
NEMZETI SPORT	296,000
NEPSZAVA	266,000
MAI NAP	249,000
KURIR	212,000
MAGYAR HIRLAP	178,000
EXPRESS	133,000
MAGYAR NEMZET	130,000
PESTI RIPORT	101,000
ESTI HIRLAP	75,000
UJ MAGYARORSZAG	73,000

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

B-H: Izetbegovic Interviewed on Sarajevo TV

LD0704213696 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2045 GMT 6 Apr 96

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina President Alija Izetbegovic by correspondent Arijana Saracevic; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Saracevic] Good evening, dear viewers. The guest of Bosnia-Herzegovina TV this evening is Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, president of the presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Good evening President. What is your health like? How do you feel?

[Izetbegovic] I am getting better.

[Saracevic] Are you back in business or is this a temporary engagement? I see that....

[Izetbegovic, interrupting] This is a temporary engagement. I am not back for good. The doctors believe that I should not go back to work yet. It will probably be another month.

[Saracevic] You had talks with the senators today who came to the presidency of the Republic.

[Izetbegovic] Professor Ganic [foreign minister] was not here today. He has gone to the Middle East. And Dr. Muratovic [prime minister] went to the farewell ceremony in Dubrovnik for the Americans who were killed, so I had to step in; I was on duty.

[Saracevic] In your absence you have given interviews just once—to LJILJAN.

[Izetbegovic] And to FOKUS.

[Saracevic] The LJILJAN interview really attracted a lot of attention. Do you stand by your remarks as set out by the paper?

[Izetbegovic] Yes.

[Saracevic] There are truly many reasons for today's conversation. Today is the fourth anniversary of the beginning of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Naturally, we will also discuss other questions. Certainly we will discuss peace and the implementation of the Dayton agreement, soldiers, refugees, and so on. As I said, the war that began four years ago is over. Can we talk about there being a victor; and if there is one, who is the victor?

[Izetbegovic] There is probably no military victor in this war. To some extent we are more the victors than the Chetniks, but some kind of balance has been maintained. Why? This is another matter. This is to do with the Dayton agreement. We are the moral victors in this war. There is no doubt about it, no disputing it. However, as regards the military situation just prior to peace, we could have been the military victors. We were stopped.

[Saracevic] What do you mean by moral victor?

[Izetbegovic] [words indistinct] It is often said that we emerged from this war with a clear conscience. We have not trampled on the international laws of war which the civilized world laid down. We acted honorably.

But the other thing is that we are moral victors to the extent that when one compares the resources which we had, and the results achieved, with their resources and their results, then we are absolutely the moral victors. After all, we achieved a great deal in military terms with no resources, while they, with their enormous resources, achieved virtually nothing. So I believe that as a result, we can say that we are the moral victors in this war.

Perhaps it would be good if I outline some circumstances that impacted for example on the cease-fire, which brought the war to an end. We could have achieved a military victory against the Chetniks in October 1995. We were stopped. We could have taken Prijedor. Most probably we could have driven them out of Banja Luka if we had continued the offensive, because they were in complete disarray. However, in practical terms, the United States stopped this war.

When I talked later to some American, a person well informed on these matters, and asked him what happened and why we had been stopped—we were virtually given an ultimatum to stop, and they said they would begin to strike us if we continued the offensive—then he explained to me that they had fairly reliable information that if the war were to continue and if the Chetniks were to be defeated, which looked very likely, then Milosevic would have had no option but to intervene with several divisions, and this could have brought about an uncontrolled process [words indistinct] war. We would have had a situation that could not be controlled. One did not know what Russia would do and the United States did not want to risk it. That was, roughly speaking, the military situation. [Saracevic] You mentioned that our fighters did not violate the Geneva Convention, that their conduct throughout the war was in line with rules of engagement. Our Bosniak marhamah [compassion; previous word in Arabic] is frequently mentioned. Were our fighters instructed to exercise compassion?

[Izetbegovic] No, they were not. And it is good that you have asked me about it. Marhamah is a word often mentioned. There is something about our civilization and culture, an aspect of them which is part of marhamah, but our soldiers were not asked to exercise it. They were required to abide by the law. Marhamah is not what we

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

are about. We are simply normal people. We are more than marhamah. To remain normal in a situation such as ours, in the circumstances that Bosnia has found itself, in the situation that resulted from aggression, to remain normal in such a situation is the maximum we could ask of our people. We could not teach our children how to hate simply because this is not part of our tradition. There is no hatred in us. There is resistance in us and we were courageous. Sometimes we were severe, but that is not marhamah. Our soldiers are neither wimps nor old women. Our soldiers our true soldiers, perhaps the best soldiers you can find today. In other words, marhamah is not at issue; our soldiers were observing basic laws, there was the absence of any hatred; that was not marhamah.

[Saracevic] The war that is behind us was exceptionally cruel. Did you expect it to be so cruel, or rather what was going through your mind in the spring of 1992 when the war started?

[Izetbegovic] I will be honest here; although, as they say, as a politician I should not be so, well, for me this war has been a whole series of unpleasant surprises. Cruelty is one of them.

You see, I remember the Second World War. I know what war is all about. When that war started I was 16, when it ended I was 20. Well, I remember it well. There was cruelty then as well, but I think no comparison is possible. In the Second World War, we had Chetniks and Ustashe as well. And, of course, a kind of partisans, of people's army, as we were. Neither the Chetniks nor the Ustashe of today are similar to those in the Second World War. The today's ones have been worse, if we compare them. For, I completed my secondary school during the Second World War, in 1943. For two years, under the Ustashe, my form teacher was a Serb, a Jokanovic, a Serb Jokanovic. There was also a [Serb] Lolovic, a teacher. In other words, under the NDH [pro-Nazi Independent State of Croatia] a Serb could be a teacher. There were Ustashe in those days, as well, but they did not destroy the bridge in Mostar. So, today's Chetniks and Ustashe are worse than the ones in the Second World War. As for the third ones [Tito's partisans], well, I have often warned, I have often compared us and the partisans, and this was met by slight protestations by some of my friends. My comparison was based on the fact that the partisans did not persecute civilians. Civilians did not have to flee before them. Women and children were not frightened of the partisans. And I used to tell our soldiers: Be like the partisans when it come to the treatment of civilians, women, and children. We do not want the people fearing our army. I think that they listened to me on this.

When it comes to cruelty, I must say that I did not expect it. I think, and I am not ashamed to admit it, I think that there are very few people—except those academicians in Belgrade, except the people like the Chetniks, etc, who were charged with executing their ideas—as I said, there are few people who could say that they had known or could have anticipated something like this in Bosnia.

[Saracevic] Many difficult moments are now behind us. What do you remember as being the most difficult?

[Izetbegovic] It is hard to say. Of course, what happened in Srebrenica was horrible, in Zepa as well; especially since Srebrenica happened after Zepa and we already knew about the drama in Zepa and tried to save those other people. These were very difficult days which cannot be forgotten.

However, if I were to choose one particular moment, I would choose the moment when I was told that the bridge in Mostar was destroyed. It is perhaps inappropriate to say this when we are talking about people's lives, but to me that was the height of insanity in this war. A friend who was with me in this office gave me the news. Someone from the security said—President, have you heard that the bridge in Mostar has just been destroyed? Later on a friend told me—who was present here at the time—that upon hearing the news I was silent for five minutes and that my mind was completely absent. I went completely dumb. I could not believe that such a thing was possible, that people were capable of doing such a thing. I must admit that during those five minutes I felt hatred for the entire human race. Furthermore, I started thinking there was no longer any point to our resistance. We were holding out on two fronts for month and months. It was November 1993 when the Chetniks attacked us from one direction. We were surrounded in several places. This was followed by the unfortunate war against the Croat Defense Council [HVO]. Then came the destruction of the bridge.

We tried to find a way out. The destruction of the bridge only went to show that we had no one to talk to any more. So if I were to choose the worst moment of the war, when I felt total and utter despair, it would have to be that moment.

[Saracevic] These were the sad moments. However, there were also happy and joyful moments. Is there one you particularly remember?

[Izetbegovic] There were several. Some were even funny. There is a funny side to the war, you know. The war produces certain characters which otherwise would have remained anonymous and would not have been noticed—courageous people, cowards, phoneys, etc.—a gallery of characters. They would make a good subject

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

for a book. This is the funny side of the war, which may seem strange at first sight.

There were many happy moments too. These were the moments when the news would arrive on army successes, when we tried to smuggle in some weapons and were successful, as if an angel carried them on its wings. Sometimes it was a real miracle how we managed to smuggle them in, bypassing all possible regulations. For instance, when we tried to bring into Sarajevo a Red Arrow [not further indentified] and the Wasps [missiles]. These were the moments—when the news came that our small dragon [?four-wheel armored vehicle] got into Sarajevo carrying the Wasps which we used destroy a number of tanks in the city.

But there is one bright moment in this war—the fantastic growth of our army. Whenever I went [to inspect army troops], I felt a noticeable progress, just like watching a plant which keeps growing.

True, they were killing us, destroying our equipment whenever they could, seizing entire trucks carrying our weapons. Curiously enough, we always ended up with even more soldiers and even more equipment. This was a series of bright moments in this war. One bright line.

[Saracevic] We can remember that you very frequently found time to spend with our soldiers, in addition to carrying on with your state duties every day; there is almost not a single brigade here in Sarajevo and further afield that you have not visited. You celebrated every new victory at the very spot. Have you ever been directly face to face with death?

[Izetbegovic] Now with a hindsight I think it was on much fewer occasions than other citizens. You who are now here in this room with me, I think that you were exposed to death much more, because when it comes to Sarajevo—the situation was quite similar in other places, but in Sarajevo, Mostar, Gorazde, and [Bosnian] Krajina to a higher degree—everyone was exposed to mortal danger every day. This happened to the people who went to fetch some water, buy bread, take a child to school: Nobody ever knew whether they would return.

In this respect I was in a somewhat more favorable position. My journey from home to my office took four to five minutes as I always went by car, which automatically reduced the level of risk. The other day when I was in the hospital, I heard of a nurse who travelled to work from Alipasino Polje every day. She had to walk for an hour and a half to work and back. Her children were left at school.

In this respect I was in a somewhat more favorable position, although there were some even funny situations: Sometimes I thought I was in deadly danger, which was not the case. When we travelled abroad we used to go in an UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] vehicle to the airport through the chetnik zone in Nedzarici. It happened on several occasions that these armored personnel carriers stopped right in the chetnik territory where [Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister] Turajlic had been killed several months before. We thought that there was a ploy, all my bodyguards took out their pistols, hand grenades, we said we would shoot as soon as the door opened.

It turned out later that it was a completely banal situation: Some Ukrainian soldiers took us to the airport. Before they came to pick us up they had sold some gasoline, as you know they were involved in black market dealings with gasoline, but unfortunately on this occasion they had sold much more than they were supposed to. And then the vehicle just stopped very close to the airport. We thought some ploy was at work there, but there was no ploy at all. I thought then that I directly faced death, but in reality I did not.

[Saracevic] We have won peace, you have signed the Dayton agreement. Do you regret it?

[Izetbegovic] It seems to me that all that has happened over the past five years could not have happened in any other way. It followed the logic of a Greek drama. It could not have happened in a different way. It seems to me so. Maybe some of my colleagues from other political parties will not agree with this—they may think that we should have acted differently all the time, but it seems to me that we could not have done it any differently from what we have done. Different decisions could not have been made.

However, I am absolutely sure of two things: I could call it two musts. We had a series of must-do things, those inevitable things that had to be done. One thing is in connection with the beginning of the war, the other in connection with the beginning of peace.

We were not able to avert the crisis that started in 1992. We were not able to avoid the referendum that in the final analysis gradually led to war. Otherwise, we would have remained in rump Yugoslavia. That was the only choice left to us—to stay under the rule of Serbia and Montenegro. In order to prevent that from happening, we had to hold the referendum. Once we held the referendum, it meant that we were inevitably heading toward war. This was one of our musts.

Another must was this Dayton peace. I would sign it again today. Perhaps the people of Sarajevo will understand better than others that this had to be done. Autumn '95 was coming. Some 300,000 people were practically trapped here in Sarajevo without heating,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

food, electricity, water, gas—winter was coming. All winters would have been easier to cope with than the winter of 1995-96 if peace had not been signed.

On the other hand, you saw in October before peace was signed that bombs fell on Zivinice killing our poor refugees there. The Serbs no longer had the courage and soldiers, but they still had many artillery pieces and shells to kill our population. Our human losses had gone beyond a tolerable level from the point of view of the biological survival of the nation. On the other hand, people's suffering had long ago become unbearable. I would sign that sort of peace also today despite all the weak points of this peace treaty.

[Saracevic] As you said, this peace has both negative and positive aspects. Which are the positive and which are the negative aspects of the agreement?

[Izetbegovic] Of the Dayton agreement, you mean? Well, as I and Silajdzic said the other day when issuing the declaration, there are obviously certain factors and elements of the Dayton peace that are being used now to destroy Bosnia, or rather to create an impression of its demise. Yes, the agreement has both its negative and positive sides. Among the positive aspects I would primarily include the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina has survived as a state and member of the United Nations, that its statehood has been preserved. This is very important despite the fact that it is only on paper. For 40 years the Baltic states existed only on paper but survived. It is a positive side that Yugoslavia, i.e., Serbia and Montenegro, had to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina. This they did by putting their signature on the Dayton agreement. The negative side is that there is the Serb Republic, but the positive side of it is that it will have to adopt a Constitution that will stipulate that it is an integral part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that, believe it or not, its army has the duty to safeguard the sovereignty and integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. If they do not do it and if they keep referring to the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, then they will be the so-called Serb Republic. If they do not accept this, then there will never be a Serb Republic. All this was interlinked.

Another positive aspect is the existence of the central bodies: The Assembly, the Presidency, the Council of Ministers exclusively in charge of foreign affairs, foreign trade, monetary policy, the common currency, the Central Payment Transactions Institute. All parts must take part in this. The negative aspect is that the decisionmaking process here is to some extent blocked by the imposition of consensus. There is a price to pay; in this case, it is the consensus and the possibility of blockades, for the good sides of the agreement. It is bad that there are three armies, but it is good that these three armies are not waging war at the moment, are not destroying anything, and that there are prospects for the elections to help in dismantling these fascist, profascist, or whatever creations gradually.

These are the good things which have to be paid for—by consensus, by possible blockade. It is bad that there are three armies; it is good that the three armies are not waging war now, that they are not destroying.... [pauses] That they are not continuing with the destruction. It is good that certain prospects are appearing slowly, that perhaps the elections will melt these fascist, or profascist, or even worse, creations.

[Saracevic] But Mr. President, there are still many warmongers. The well-known Muslim-haters claim that the match is going to continue. Will there be a continuation and are we ready for it, if it happens?

[Izetbegovic] You are talking about the statement by Miroljub Jeftic in Banja Luka. He says it very clearly; I have read his speech. He says: Yes, we have lost the first half. So, he believes that they have lost.

I have just said that unfortunately they did not lose, but they could have lost militarily. But then he says there will be a second half, we will take revenge for this in the second half.

I believe there will be no second half. I believe so, but I have to tell you that I am not much of a forecaster when it comes to war. I have never been the announcer of evil and some object to that. They mention 1992 when I said there would not be war.

This time again, I believe that there will not be war, that there will not be the second half.

However, if there is, they will lose that war, that second half. If they were not able to achieve anything with this giant—the weapons inherited from the Yugoslav army—with the enormous intact arsenal of the former Yugoslav army, and without the burden of loss they have now, then.... [unfinished as heard] When they could not destroy us in 1992—in such a disadvantageous situation for us, when they were here in Sarajevo and we managed to drive them out, when they had eight large military barracks in and around the city—then they will never manage to do it.

Our people have gained self-confidence in this war. In short, I believe that there will be no second half.

[Saracevic] The role of the international community is disputable. After Dayton, it is obvious that it will not deliver what it promised. Why?

[Izetbegovic] I must say that the international community is not a completely coordinated team, or an orches-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

tra which plays the same tune under the same conductor. It is quite a mixed group in which we have both friends—lukewarm and ardent—and those who are not our friends, not to say foes. All these make up the international community.

However, I think that the difficulties with the implementation of the Dayton agreement, especially the military aspect and money for reconstruction.... [pauses] There are more profound reasons for it, which are closer to home, i.e., in some centers in Belgrade and Zagreb. You see, if someone wants to make a donation for Bosnia-Herzegovina's reconstruction, he must have a well-organized state to which he can give this money. We are being prevented from organizing our own state. If we look to find who is preventing it, traces take us to some centers in Belgrade and Zagreb. I think that is where the difficulties lie.

The international community can only make a donation to a clearly defined state. It must know what its bodies and institutions are, who will sign the documents showing that the money was received, who will be responsible, and who will return the money tomorrow.

We have difficulties in organizing all this. And as I said, the traces lead to these two centers. The international community [words indistinct]

[Saracevic] The international community is blaming us for the Serb exodus from Sarajevo. How much truth is there in this and why is it doing this?

[Izetbegovic] I discussed this with U.S. senators today. I told them what was happening here. People often do not see. They know that the majority of Serbs left Sarajevo suburbs, which have become part of the federation. I told them we granted amnesty to them, that we kept inviting them to stay, offering them to take part in the power structure. We said, for instance, that if a mayor of a municipality is a Bosniak, the speaker of the municipal assembly would be a Serb—to provide guarantees to these people. We also offered them to be part of a mixed police—Bosniak-Serb-Croat police—to no avail. The propaganda from Pale, overt propaganda in which every other word was revenge or life together is impossible, and then threats—surely, we were not supposed to beg them on our knees. We did all we could.

Sometimes it seems to me that the world is not well-enough informed. From the point of view of the collective responsibility, there are criminals, and there are people. We demand that the criminals be punished. When the criminals are punished, the people are innocent.

We expected that a certain part of the people would stay. That did not happen. But these are indisputable facts: the amnesty, the share of power, participation in the mixed police, these are our obligations. What more were we supposed to do?

[Saracevic] But a lot of Serbs have already come back to Grbavica. How do you explain that?

[Izetbegovic] This process is taking place. It is not unexpected, bearing in mind the facts I have just mentioned.

I do have reliable reports that those up there [in Pale] are trying to prevent people from returning as much as possible. Namely, they, just like us, know that Sarajevo is a test for the possibility of Bosnia-Herzegovina's survival. We do want Bosnia-Herzegovina to survive as a state, as a multiethnic and multicultural country, their goal is quite the opposite: to prove that such a Bosnia cannot exist. Sarajevo is the test for the two.

[Saracevic] Since we are discussing Sarajevo, I would like to ask you if you remember the crisis in Hadzici. Is it true that it was then that you decided that the Croats should be resisted if their police did not leave Hadzici?

[Izetbegovic] That is true; we sent them a clear message not to try to enter Hadzici. They have neither the right nor the reasons to do that. We told them clearly that this would mean a conflict for which they would bear full responsibility. And there would be no doubt that if IFOR [Implementation Force] had not removed them, we would have. We warned them several days, five days before. We sent a clear message that they should not attempt to block our communication. We had suffered the siege for much too long and we would not stand it any longer, regardless of what might happen. There are issues where we can make concessions, compromises, agreements, but there are issues that cannot be up for negotiations. We will not be under siege ever again. Whatever price we have to pay, Sarajevo and other cities will never be under siege again.

Of course, we sent them this message. Fortunately, IFOR got involved, because we told IFOR the same thing—if you do not remove them, we will. IFOR did it, it took the warning seriously, so the crisis was settled.

There was another crisis the other day over the barracks in Butila and Blazuj. It was resolved in a satisfactory way, too.

We have also let it be known to IFOR that we will not stand the blockade ever again. We suffered for four years under siege. This can never happen again.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Saracevic] At the moment it is frequently said that the Croats in Sarajevo feel threatened. Are they intimidated in Sarajevo?

[Izetbegovic] It is the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] who says so. Others do not say that. The HDZ does not have any moral right to say so because, on the territory controlled by Bosnian legal authorities, all Catholic religious buildings are operating.

All Catholic places of worship are operating that want to operate, that have the flock, that have the populace who is interested in attending a place of worship. Not a single mosque operates on the territory controlled by the Croat Defense Council.

Here, the HDZ branches are operating, and wherever they wanted to open one they could. The central office is in Sarajevo, I do not know if it has been already transferred. There, there is not a single branch, not only of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], but of any other party.

Here, a whole range of Catholic Croat schools are working. There is a Catholic school center, the faculty is going to be opened soon, there is a new high school in Visoko, I believe there are Catholic centers in Zenica and Tuzla. On the territory under the HDZ control there is not a single maktab [previous word in Arabic: primary religious school], let alone a high school or faculty.

A whole range of Croat newspapers, political and religious, are being published here; no newspapers are being published there. Thousands of Croats live in Bugojno, where they say they feel threatened. Only 16 Bosniaks live in Stolac.

This is all to say that the HDZ does not have any moral right to talk about the threat to the Croat people here.

[Saracevic] Have you discussed this with representatives of the church?

[Izetbegovic] Yes, I have mentioned it on several occasions and asked them to do something in connection with this.

[Saracevic] What did you asked them to do?

[Izetbegovic] I asked them to.... [pauses] I explained what the situation was like, in particular, regarding the religious freedom. Their answer was always: We, unfortunately, are not the authorities. As if they wanted to say that, were they the authorities, they would correct this.

[Saracevic] And what did you tell them?

[Izetbegovic] I told them I knew they were not the authorities and could not order anything, but I also said that the church has a powerful voice, that it should raise its voice and clearly say it is a disgrace that a Muslim cannot be buried in western Mostar. It is a disgrace; this is untenable, not just disgraceful. This can continue for more than a year or two, or three, but it cannot go on forever. We expect them to raise their voice against it, since it could change the situation. When the church raises its voice, things start moving.

I do not know if this will be the case, but the situation in this respect is still—I cannot say unchanged, but there are only very small and insufficient improvements. For instance, people can gather for a prayer in Livno, but a muezzin is not allowed to call the faithful from a minaret unless he does it silently, so that he cannot be heard.

As you know, it does not bother us to hear church bells ringing and we are not against midnight masses. We even lift curfews for these occasions and half the town—including non-Catholics—goes out to the streets for the midnight mass and takes part in the celebrations. It is unthinkable that anything like this should happen for Bairam in western Mostar, Capljina, etc., where a large number of Muslims once lived, but which is no longer the case.

[Saracevic] Does that mean that you are not satisfied with Croatian policy towards Bosnia?

[Izetbegovic] Are you thinking of state policy?

[Saracevic] Yes.

[Izetbegovic] I am not satisfied, because there are still powerful elements of interference in Bosnia's internal affairs. For example, a few days ago, [Croatian] Defense Minister Mr. Susak said the Croatian Army would protect Croat interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was an impermissible statement. And Brajkovic [mayor of Croat-controlled western Mostar] said: We will ask President Tudjman what we should do. I believe the day will come when Croatia will stop interfering in the internal affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Until this happens, things will not be good either for Croatia or for us. Croatia will be harmed by this, of course, because we will increasingly tell the world about this. The world does not tolerate interference by one state in the affairs of another. This is a practice that has been abandoned and the world will not permit this.

[Saracevic] Nevertheless, are there any positive moves forward?

[Izetbegovic] Here and there, but I have to say that this is more like a zigzagging line. In general, I am not satisfied with this situation and I believe it has to be changed to affirm the principle of the equality of the two countries. Unless this happens, there can be no real

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

progress in relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

[Saracevic] Many of our refugees abroad are waiting to see what stance Croatia will assume. Do you believe that refugees will return to Bosnia-Herzegovina, i.e., what did it mean when you recently said that the question of refugees is to be or not to be of Bosnia-Herzegovina? [sentence as heard]

[Izetbegovic] I think the return of refugees is really the question of to be or not to be of a Bosnia-Herzegovina as we perceive it—again an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina. The demographic structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been altered through ethnic cleansing and genocide—what came in the wake of genocide is what is euphemistically called ethnic cleansing. The demographic picture of Bosnia-Herzegovina has changed. Forceful homogenization of the population has taken place, which brings a potential danger of the break up of Bosnia. This situation can be improved only by the return of the people to their homes.

The return of refugees is indeed the question of to be or not to be of Bosnia-Herzegovina, if we wish for it. This is guaranteed by the Dayton agreement and we will insist on that. If you can remember, one of the points of our declaration refers to a demand that the provision of the Dayton agreement regarding the return of refugees should be implemented. This provision has remained a mere proclamation which has not been supported by force; it has to be supported by the force of the people who wish to return to Modrica. They have to be enabled to return. Those people who wish to remain, as is the case with our six villages that have become famous, in which people have refused to leave, even though these villages are to be given to the Serb authorities—those people are saying they can survive there and want to survive—they have to be helped out by IFOR and the international community. The force of their authority must put this into practice.

Will all refugees return? Well, first of all, a majority of them will return. I think, in this respect, obstacles lying in the way of its realization will be overcome gradually. When it comes to visas and transit through Croatia, it will be overcome; I think this issue has already been resolved in a satisfactory manner. I do not know how this agreement is functioning in practice, but there will not be any obstacles. Anyhow, many governments have announced repatriation of our refugees from their countries—Switzerland and Germany recently, they have their programs of repatriation. We will reinforce our demographic structure here, but we would like people to return also to Foca, Zvornik, Banja Luka. We will insist on that.

IFOR has done the military part of the job. I think it is now turning gradually to the so-called civilian part of the job, to provide assistance in the civilian part of the job. They have embarked upon the reconstruction of some facilities. We will ask them to devote themselves to this issue in particular. As you are already asking, I would like to say that even here among us there are forces saying that we should not return over there. I hold that such statements are impermissable.

Those who can allow the possibility that our people will not return to Bijeljina do not belong to our ranks. Those who accept such a possibility even theoretically do not belong to us. Of course, the practical side of the issue is a different problem, but you first have to accept the very principle. Who disputes this principle is working directly against Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Saracevic] Fighters are becoming impatient. You are the mastermind of the proposal on the distribution of army salaries. Will shares or savings passbooks be given out as it has been said recently?

[Izetbegovic] Unfortunately, this job has taken too long. One thing is to launch a project, another thing is to put it into practice. It has turned out that it involves a lot of work. But this work, according to latest reports that I have received, is nearing completion. There has been a lot of technical work to be done. From this place I can promise our fighters that first savings passbooks will be given out on 15 April. I have seen these passbooks, they are in the process of being printed; I have seen piles of accounts that are completed. Funds for that exist, not in cash, but in state property.

[Saracevic] Does this mean that they will be able to buy anything?

[Izetbegovic] Of course, if they could not buy anything, it would be worthless. Above all, they will be able to buy apartments, pay customs duties, and buy company shares when privatization is announced. The funds will be in German marks [DM] and their value will not suffer if there is a waiting period. They will be able to buy equipment for their work.

[Saracevic] What will happen if someone arrives with cash, with German marks? Naturally, owners like cash more than a savings passbook. Does this mean that certain laws will be changed to grant the war veterans priority status regarding the aforementioned transactions?

[Izetbegovic] That is a good question. Even in cases when the state is the owner, there is reason for concern. Someone could appear with DM200,000-300,000 in cash and, on the other hand, you have war veterans with their passbooks. However, they could combine their funds. We are not talking about great amounts of

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners

money here. The maximum is DM25,000 or DM28,000 for those who spent the whole war in the army. Two, three, or four of them could pool their funds and buy business premises, for example, which they could let later.

It is better if they are the owners, if they employ the people who were not soldiers, than the other way round—the war profiteers buying business premises and employing our soldiers. That is why the government will discuss a bill asking for absolute priority status. The law has not been passed yet, but we will insist on it being passed. The federal government is responsible for this. In addition to this law, which defines what can be bought, it has to determine the priority status of those with passbooks. They should be given priority over those with cash, which sounds a bit illogical in economic terms. However, we must pass what we can. Otherwise, we could have a situation in which war profiteers will have an advantage over soldiers. We will, God willing, begin to distribute the passbooks on the 15 April, on Army Day, to the units. The process will then be continuous and I think it will last for two or three months, until the last soldier gets his passbook. There will be about 250,000 recipients, including the police.

[Saracevic] [Bosnian Defense] Minister Soljic has lodged a protest, because the HVO soldiers are not included in the [passbook] scheme. Is he right?

[Izetbegovic] He is not right. In addition to other reasons, our soldiers have not been paid. As far as we know, HVO soldiers have been paid and, let me make this clear, to a great extent with our money. This is the money they took from customs duties down there [in Herzeg-Bosnia], the money which never reached Bosnia-Herzegovina, even though it is the income of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These funds have been used to pay the HVO. Therefore, I think that his complaint is groundless in this respect.

[Saracevic] The elections are a popular topic, will they be held?

[Izetbegovic] I believe they will be held. As you know the decision should be made in June. The OSCE, which will send several thousand people to supervise the elections, has to assess the situation, see if the conditions have been fulfilled, and make a decision on this. I believe they will adopt this decision, despite the fact that they will be facing a great dilemma. They have to assess if the conditions are fulfilled by those up there [the Serbs]. Two conditions are the bare minimum. We must have some kind of free elections, and certain political conditions have to be fulfilled. This means that people should be able to organize a political party, that the SDA and SDP [former Communists] can set up a Bosnian political party in Banja Luka. Right now they cannot do this and I do not know if they will be able to do this in two or three months.

The other thing is to enable a number of people, at least some of them to return—I am speaking about the refugees. In our opinion, the elections should be held, regardless. However, there is a risk which should be taken into account. If there is an unfortunate development of events, if the elections are not well prepared, they could result in the legalization of the existing authorities. This would not be good at all.

[Saracevic] Will you stand?

[Izetbegovic] It depends on my recovery. To tell you the truth, I have still not made that decision.

[Saracevic] What do you expect from the elections, can you predict anything?

[Izetbegovic] I have already had a chance to answer that question. I said that the SDA [Stranka Demokratske Akcije—Party of Democratic Action] would triumph in the elections and take all the Bosniak votes if it remains united. This was before Silajdzic's departure and the situation has changed after it, of course.

I think the other parties will not get many votes. The party I belong to [the SDA] also stands for an integral and democratic Bosnia. It has also proven something, done something concrete. It has preserved some kind of a democracy here. However, I do not want to speak about this any longer. I do not want to turn this into some kind of propaganda for elections, but these are my predictions.

As far as the Serb entity is concerned, the Chetniks and their Pale SDS [Srpska Demokratska Stranka—Serb Democratic Party] will probably hold on to a strong position, accompanied by pro-Milosevic parties and, to a lesser extent, by pro-Bosnian Serb parties, which is unfortunate.

[Saracevic] I would like to ask you something and then we can go back to elections. Has the Serb entity, or the so-called Serb Republic, recognized the Bosnian state?

[Izetbegovic] No, it has not. I told you just now, speaking about the Dayton agreement, that there were good and bad sides to it. The bad thing is that it has legalized the Serb Republic, and the good thing is that the Serb Republic, as such, has to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina because it is its constituent part. It even has to include it, that its army will defend the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that it has to participate in the central governing bodies, and so on.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Up to this point in time, although the deadline was 14 March, the Serb Republic has not done anything. If the Serb Republic does not change its constitution, where it has to say clearly that it is a constituent part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that its army has this particular task, that it will take part in the central governing bodies, the Serb Republic does not exist.

[Saracevic] While we are discussing this, do you notice the trend to blame all sides equally? What do you think about that? Are they all equally guilty?

[Izetbegovic] There is that sort of propaganda both abroad and here. For instance, they establish that our soldier has committed a crime—this was a long, cruel war, and there are people whose dearest family perished, there are people who lost five to six very close relatives. These things have happened, I do not wish to conceal them. A soldier would take revenge, but this was very rare.

Now, such a case is revealed and it is said: They are all the same. The case of the murder of two Serb civilians is equalled with the murder of 7,000 or 8,000 people from Srebrenica. This is now the same for them.

In fact, there are powers abroad that do not want to admit the reality, the truth here—that the Bosnian authorities were democratic, that the Bosnian army behaved in line with international laws. They do not want to admit this because then they would have some obligations; they would have to reach some long-term conclusions which are not to their liking. Thus, each and every case is used to paint everyone as equally guilty.

I read an article the other day by a Serb intellectual who, since he knows what the Serb army did here in Bosnia-Herzegovina, says: They did it, they are all the same, they should all go, they should all be swept by history, because it is clear to him what Karadzic and his people, Mladic and his soldiery, did here.

Since he cannot negate this, he includes the Bosnian army, the Bosnian leadership, the Croat leadership, and so on. He equals them all.

There is something abroad which sometimes, to be honest, smells of a small conspiracy against us. Every case is obviously blown up. Among other things, it is said that a kind of fundamentalism exists here because the world needs to be prevented from helping Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We are a small people. There are countries and powers which will put their card on bigger peoples. They think: The Serbs are the biggest people here in the Balkans; why would we come into dispute with the Serbs because of the Bosnians. So they are prepared to close their eyes before what has been done. They are prepared to ignore the responsibility which the Serb leadership and army have for what has been done in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, for instance, in Sarajevo, which is unacceptable.

They are prepared to close their eyes, not to see this, and they are prepared to say: Well, they all did the same things, but we did not. Thank God that we did not.

[Saracevic] I said that we would return to the issue of elections. New parties have been formed. Mr. Silajdzic [former Bosnian prime minister] has formed the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Objections are put to him that he will divide the Bosniak people. Is there any truth in this, can there be a division within the Bosniak people?

[Izetbegovic] I will tell you something I have told Silajdzic in a recent conversation. Obviously, there will be a disintegration within the Bosniak people. Some will stay with the SDA, some will join Silajdzic's party, some will vote for the Socialist Democratic Party [SDP], and so on.

These are the main three parties, we could perhaps include the liberals, who would gain some votes.

I told Silajdzic: Your attempt makes sense, regardless of the fact that it is detrimental to the unity of the Bosniak people, which it obviously is—it is one thing if there is single strong party and another if there are two different parties—under the condition that you dent the unity of the other bloc, Serb and Croat. If you are capable of putting across the idea of Bosnia-Herzegovina's unity to the other side, and dent their unity—because at the moment they are quite monolithic in their anti-Bosnian orientation, in their orientation towards the Serb purity in the Serb entity, and the Croat purity on the territories controlled by the HVO.

If you are capable of crossing there, I will be the first to vote for your party; I told him so literally. If I see that you are achieving some results there, then there will be no problems, then the price paid by the lesser unity of the Bosniak people makes sense, and that price should be paid.

However, to be honest, I do not envisage this happening. I think this will all end up as an experiment, in the disintegration of the Bosniak people, and that not even 1,000 votes will be gained there. Between 100,000-200,000 votes should be gained from the Serb population, and between 50,000 and 100,000 votes from the Croat population, for this price to be worth paying. Otherwise, it will absolutely be to our detriment.

After all, our programs are not essentially different, it is not an issue of democracy, because democracy is never perfect. One can always do more, but nobody

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

can dispute that there is democracy here, that there is freedom of political organization, freedom of media—there are so many radio and television stations—I do not know what else Silajdzic could contribute so that there are more freedoms.

Therefore, probably we will not gain anything democracy-wise; I do not believe anything further can be gained which the SDA would not gain in its further development, by correcting some shortcomings.

But we will lose the unity and then, since nothing has been achieved in the Serb entity and the territories controlled by the Croats, we will have this situation: We are the majority in Stolac, but we do not have the power; we are the majority in Bugojno, but we have a very problematic situation—this is because we have been disunited.

Is it all worth it? It seems to me that it is not. On the other hand, the SDA has become not only a Bosnian movement, but it has gathered Bosniaks from all over the world; it has become a global movement. Some other party will never be able to do this again.

The SDA does have many shortcomings, in particular regarding the personnel, because it had to produce ministers, diplomats, soldiers, generals. It is quite stretched in many ways.

It seems to me that it would have been better to have improved this movement, corrected its mistakes, filled the gaps, then changed it. You know, if you build a house and the roof leaks, it is better to repair the roof than destroy the house and build another one.

The fact is that the SDA has been present in Sandzak, it gathered all Bosniaks in Sandzak, in Croatia all Bosniaks are in this party too. It has branches in Switzerland, Germany, Australia, the United States. This cannot be repeated. It can happen only once.

[Saracevic] Have you spoken with Mr. Silajdzic about a possible coalition?

[Izetbegovic] No, we have not. We only spoke about the various problems that the new party would pose. Of course, he defended his position largely by saying that, in his view, further democratization was necessary, that it would open way for further democratization. Perhaps he is right, who knows. In any case, I wish Silajdzic good luck. Let him have a go.

[Saracevic] The declaration on united Bosnia-Herzegovina, signed recently at your and Mr. Silajdzic's initiative, is it, perhaps, a step towards a coalition?

[Izetbegovic] No, no, not at all. Although it is not a feature of a politician, we were quite honest over this. In this particular case, we wanted to counter an obvious development and I was surprised to see other parties obstructing us. Attempts were at work to create an atmosphere that Bosnia no longer existed. Their argument was: Well, Bosnia's integrity was declared at an earlier stage. Yes, but it is not amiss, it will not hurt anyone to reiterate this, all the more so since the situation is a dynamic and not a static one. Practically speaking, if you look at events abroad and, since they have an immediate effect internally in the country as well, you could see that attempts were being made to create an impression that Bosnia, as a state, was not possible. It was a situation that never existed before. The declaration was my call to counter this tendency, which, as far as I am concerned, was very clear and which is not questioned by the parties that failed to sign the declaration.

It would have been good if we succeeded in creating a united front over these two issues. You see, I do not understand their explanation and that is why I have described it as a political ploy intolerable in the present situation. They say: We have not been invited early enough to discuss the issues. Well, we thought that, perhaps, other issues should be discussed but something that is crystal clear and indisputable, i.e., that we are for a united Bosnia, for a civic, democratic state. We thought that this was no matter for discussion. All we needed to do was to gather people together to reaffirm this, to restate it loudly, to send a clear signal and message both to the public abroad and the people who have the fate of Bosnia in their hands, to show them that there is, here, in Bosnia, a strong, united front against the disintegration of Bosnia and which will oppose it. This, we thought, should have been our message. We did not think that a conference was necessary so we could ask: Are you for a united Bosnia, who is for a united Bosnia, etc. We invited all the parties that declared themselves for a united Bosnia before and I cannot understand, except that it is a political ploy completely out of place at the moment, the fact that these parties failed to respond and to sign such a document.

In any case, the people and other institutions not interested in ploys have responded on a large scale. We did not invite the academy because we thought that, perhaps, it was not a political institution. It offered to send a representatives to sign the declaration, but many people did the same. [Saracevic] But still, why do you think the opposition parties refused to sign the declaration?

[Izetbegovic] I have said that my interpretation of it is that this is some sort of a ploy on their part.

[Saracevic] What is at work here?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Izetbegovic] They thought that by signing they will align themselves with Izetbegovic and Silajdzic. What is the problem in aligning with us when it comes to such an important issue. It now looks as if you want to have a drinking fountain built at a crossroads for the thirsty to quell their thirst, but you first ask who is going to build it. If it turns out that someone who you do not like does it, you are not going to build that fountain. This was a noble and good act. It would not have represented any political burden for them.

I think that they have miscalculated in this respect. I think that they have lost a lot of the rating they had before. Their rating was not too high anyhow. The rating of the Republican Party is not too high, which can also be said about the Social Democratic Party, the Union of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Intellectuals, and the Muslim Bosniak Organization in particular.

The Republican Party and the Muslim Bosniak Organization perhaps have 1,000 to 2,000 members in Sarajevo. The little rating they had was lost by their failure to sign such a document that was absolutely nonpolitical, not political in the general sense of the word. This was only done to affirm some indisputable principles that had to be emphasized again.

[Saracevic] How do you comment on Mr. Komsic's statement that through the declaration you wanted to share the burden for developments that took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Izetbegovic] If I was to blame for some things that are not good, then I will also take credit for everything that is good, then I should be praised for peace in Sarajevo, which is not the case. One person is too insignificant to be to blame for many things and to be praised for many other things. A great many people can take credit for our achievements in Bosnia, for what we have managed to preserve, and of course they bear a bit of responsibility for what is not right.

Therefore, this allegation is not valid. I have said that I will sign the Dayton agreement also today, if this is what Komsic had in mind. I think that our people stand behind it. I will tell you something: A cry was heard in my neighborhood one night. Some wailing could be heard throughout the night. The day after I learned that a family in my neighborhood had learned that their son had been killed on Mt. Treskavica.

The only thing that I thought about then was how much wailing there must have been throughout the war. That had to be halted. All those who think that I could have proceeded along a different path do not feel for these people. They do not have any feelings. A gentleman sitting in his villa in Switzerland tells me that there can be no peace, that we should go all the way to the Drina River, and that only then can we sign peace. He is telling me this from his villa in Switzerland, me living here in Sarajevo.

I do not understand Komsic's remark—what sort of blame should we share, and for what. I think that Mr. Komsic should go to our cemeteries, and see names on the graves.

[Saracevic] Since we are discussing Mr. Komsic, himself, Mr. Pejanovic, Mrs. Ljuic-Mijatovic, and Mr. Kljuic are complaining that they do not have enough influence in the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you think they are right?

[Izetbegovic] That is the problem of representation. The Presidency is not some academy. One cannot be there as an individual because he has written some books—he cannot be there as an individual, as a great name. The Presidency is a representative body and everyone's influence in the Presidency is proportionate to the base behind him, to the number of people he represents.

It is not my fault or responsibility that, say, not many Croats defended Bosnia-Herzegovina. And the graves I have just mentioned, it is not my fault that, after all, mainly Bosniak sons stood to defend Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is not me who should be blamed, perhaps Komsic should feel a bit guilty for this before me. The Bosniak people answered to the last person the call to defend the homeland. And they were killed doing this, they lost their best sons.

If Komsic and Kljuic had managed to make the Croat people believe in the same thing, everything would have been completely different in Bosnia-Herzegovina today. I can say this much about the subject.

[Saracevic] Mr. President, our program is nearing the end. Is there anything you would like to say to our people here and the refugees abroad?

[Izetbegovic] I am always embarrassed when it comes to messages. To a great extent, everything I have said so far is a message. The message is that we will continue with our struggle for an undivided Bosnia-Herzegovina, that we will do our best to return people to their homes, that we will do everything, put pressure on players both here and abroad, and work on this. We will build the Federation, which we have not mentioned, as a phase toward the undivided Bosnia-Herzegovina. We will try to have as little injustice as possible, and we know that there will always be injustice, it cannot be avoided.

We will invest funds in schools for the soldiers. We will try to reconstruct Bosnia-Herzegovina bearing in mind the criteria that affect our poor, people who

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

have invested everything in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We will try to give priority to soldiers when it comes to employment, whether here or abroad, and we will not forget the families of killed soldiers.

[Saracevic] It is the Day of the Police today and the Day of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in a few days time. Would you like to say something to them?

[Izetbegovic] I think I have already spoken about them. Namely, talking about the shiny thread that weaves everything, I was talking about our army and our police who played an equal part in the defense. They have never lagged behind the army. Especially in Sarajevo, in the first days of the war, perhaps they were ahead of the army that was only being formed.

Yesterday I watched the special police exercise and I was really proud of those men. At that moment I thought that, whether in the second half or in overtime, we could not lose.

[Saracevic] So, Bosnia has a future.

[Izetbegovic] God willing.

[Saracevic] Mr. President, thank you for being our guest.

[Izetbegovic] Thank you.

B-H: PM Expects 'Major' Donations From Islamic Countries

AU0804151496 Paris AFP in English 1439 GMT 8 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 8 (AFP)—Bosnia will expect Islamic countries to make a major contribution at a key donor conference in Brussels this weekend, Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic said in Sarajevo Monday [8 April].

Speaking two days before ministers from the enlarged contact group of the Organisation of Islamic Conference meet in Sarajevo Wednesday, Muratovic said the group would discuss the peace implementation process and reconstruction.

"We expect bilateral contributions from European Union countries and Islamic countries," at the conference in Brussels starting Friday, Muratovic said.

The event, being organised jointly by the European Union and World Bank, is expected to raise some 1.2 billion dollars in pledges of reconstruction and development aid for war-shattered Bosnia this year.

Around 600 million dollars has already been pledged for this year, but few actual projects have started as yet.

The issue of funding for reconstruction has caused divisions among potential contributors, with the European Union calling for a three-way split among the EU, the United States and the Islamic world, while the United States has said Europe should shoulder the greater part of the burden resulting from a conflict in its own backyard.

A funding conference in Ankara earlier this year involving several Islamic states produced few pledges of support.

Foreign ministers and officials from 17 Islamic countries, long vocal in their support for Bosnia, will meet in Sarajevo Wednesday and will decide on a common statement on their contribution to the Brussels conference.

So far, most potential donors have been coy about their plans to contribute.

The ministers and officials attending the Sarajevo meeting will attend from Bahrain Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates and will start arriving Tuesday for preparatory meetings.

They are scheduled to hold a walkabout in downtown Sarajevo Tuesday.

Muratovic said meanwhile he did not expect Bosnian Serbs to particpiate in the Brussels conference "because of their attitude toward war-prisoners."

B-H: Muratovic, Officials Support Ruling on German Mark

AU0804195296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 8 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The collegium of the governor of the National Bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina today examined the situation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina dinar and recent market phenomena. The collegium was briefed on the conclusions reached at today's meeting hosted by Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic, which was attended by National Bank Governor Kasim Omicevic; Finance Minister Mirsad Kikanovic; Maruf Burnazovic, director of the republican Payment Operations Institute; Interior Minister Avdo Hebib; Deputy Federal Finance Minister Mirsada Curcic Selimovic; and Financial Police Director Zufer Dervisevic. At this meeting, they agreed on measures that will be undertaken by state offices within their legal rights and duties to maintain monetary stability.

They jointly concluded that the key reason for the current disturbances lie in the passage of a decree on accounts for payments into the Bosnia-Herzegovina federal budget, the manner of payment of these dues, and

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the informing of the users about them, which was passed by Federal Finance Minister Drago Bilandzija in Mostar on 8 March 1996, and which, among other things, stipulates that the income of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation be paid in German marks exclusively, pursuant to the provisions of Article 59 of the Law on Internal Payment Operations, which should be reviewed by the incumbent authorities and invalidated.

According to the provision quoted, the income of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation payable in German marks exclusively are import duties, special import tariffs, storage taxes, and special value added taxes. The system of payment for goods and services, as well as the payment of taxes, duties, and other obligations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is regulated by the law, which clearly states that we have a parallel system of payment with two monetary units—a domestic one, the dinar, and a foreign one, the German mark. The law, among other things, also specifies when the dinar or the German mark is to be used as the sole means of payment. It also states that in the cases of parallel use of German marks and dinars, the transaction bills must be calculated in accordance with the official National Bank exchange rate. In light of this, the National Bank is of the opinion that the income specified in the above decree can also be paid in a parallel fashion with dinars and German marks.

The collegium upheld the expose by the National Bank governor at the news conference held at the National Bank the day before. It was particularly stressed that this was done effectively and in a timely fashion and that the situation on the Sarajevo market has already calmed down substantially today.

It was confirmed once again that the reasons for such occurrences do not lie in the monetary sphere created and realized by the National Bank but rather in the conduct of the fiscal policy. It is imperative to remove all these reasons to restore the monetary stability and trust in the dinar as the sole domestic means of payment at the level of a couple of days ago. However, if certain disturbances caused by the monetary arrangements of the National Bank do occur, there are mechanism available to neutralize them through the National Bank interventions on the foreign currency market, independently or together with the commercial banks. The National Bank has sufficient foreign currency reserves for such an intervention, it is written in today's statement from the cabinet of the governor of the National Bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Herzeg-Bosnia Commission Hands Over 28 Serb POW's

LD0604091196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0827 GMT 6 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Mrkonjic Grad, 6 Apr (SRNA)—The Herzeg-Bosnia commission for the exchange of POW's handed over 28 Serb fighters to the commission for the exchange of POW's of the Serb Army's First Krajina Corps at 0100 [2300 GMT 5 April] near the village of Blagaj on the Kupres plateau.

The remaining 12 Serb fighters—who were also supposed to be released—will stay in Rodoc prison until their documents are processed by representatives of The Hague tribunal.

SRNA's correspondent reports that both the Serb Army and Herzeg-Bosnia commissions expected the remaining 12 Serbs to be freed in the course of the day. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Croatia: Tudjman Receives Canadian Foreign Minister

LD0904124296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 9 Apr 96

[Report by correspondent Zoltan Kabok]

[FBIS Translated Text] President of the Republic Dr. Franjo Tudjman today received the Canadian foreign minister, His Excellency Lloyd Axworthy. In their talks, President Tudjman thanked Minister Axworthy for Canada's participation in the peace forces in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and for its support in reaching and implementing the peace accords.

The main aim of the Republic of Croatia is to complete as soon as possible the process of peacefully reintegrating the Danubian region, still under [Serb] occupation, of implementing the Washington agreements on the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its linking with the Republic of Croatia, and of implementing the Dayton Agreement, President Tudjman said. He went on to say that the Republic of Croatia is in favor of normalizing relations with the states that emerged from the disintegration of former Yugoslavia but that it is decidedly against Croatia being drawn into some kind of new Balkan or similar association.

Geopolitically and historically, Croatia is part of the West and of Central Europe and its main aim is to join European associations as soon as possible, President Tudjman said. Croatia expects Canada to support it in these efforts as well as in its efforts to join the Partnership for Peace program and to gain full membership of NATO.

The president drew attention to the important contribution of the Croatian community of Canada in the struggle for the independence of the Republic of Croatia and went on to add that Canadian Croats should be a bridge between the two states especially in investing in Croatia and in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Minister Axworthy said that Canada will continue to contribute to efforts to implement the Washington and Dayton agreements, to the reconstruction of the Republic of Croatia and the federation, and to efforts to enhance economic and all other forms of cooperation between the two states.

The talks were attended by Dr Ivo Sanader, head of the president's office; by Deputy Foreign Minister Hidajet Biscevic; by Zeljko Urban, ambassador of the Republic of Croatia to Canada; and by Dubravka Pleic Markovic, the president's foreign policy assistant adviser.

The Canadian minister was accompanied by (Graham Green), Canadian ambassador to the Republic of Croatia.

Croatia: 'International Terrorists' From Bosnia Arrested

LD0804181196 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 8 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We are returning to the session of the Defense and National Security Council—to the part that deals with the arrest of international terrorists. We have just received a statement from the Interior Ministry that explains what sort of terrorist group was arrested.

The police have arrested a group of citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Senj on 4 April this year. In the course of the investigation carried out so far a well-founded suspicion was established that they belonged to a terrorist group which was preparing and intending to carry out a terrorist act in Croatia.

According to details and material evidence obtained so far, members of the group had come to Croatia with weapons that they were intending to use in a terrorist action. On the basis of all evidence obtained so far about which the state attorney and the investigative center of the county court in Rijeka have been informed, it is beyond any doubt that they were involved in preparing and planning an act of antistate terrorism.

We would like to recall that heads of state and prime ministers of about 30 countries, including the U.S. President, gathered at an international conference in Cairo in mid-March and adopted conclusions on the struggle against international terrorism and measures to eradicate all international terrorist acts.

Departments of the Croatian Interior Ministry in cooperation with other parts of the Croatian security system are continuing to act to uncover and prevent all forms of attacks by terrorist groups, particularly members of international terrorist groups.

Members of the operational departments of Interior Ministry are continuing the investigation in connection with this case and will inform the public about their findings in due course.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FYROM: Prime Minister Hails Treaty With FRY

LD0804223796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2227 GMT 8 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, April 8 (TANJUG)—Macedonian Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski described late on Monday as extremely important the signing of a treaty regulating relations and promoting cooperation between Yugoslavia and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

The treaty, signed in Belgrade earlier in the day, creates a still better climate for putting into practice the commitment of establishing equally good relations with all neighbours or, in Skopje parlance, pursuing a "policy of equidistance."

"This event rounds off the first stage of developing relations between the Republic of Macedonia and its neighbours," Crvenkovski said, speaking on state television.

Macedonian Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckoski, who signed the treaty with his Yugoslav counterpart Milan Milutinovic, informed the government late on Monday about the details of the treaty and results of the Belgrade talks.

The government noted at the session that the treaty "not only regulates bilateral relations with Yugoslavia (federation of Serbia and Montenegro), but also ensures the stabilisation of the political situation in the region," a statement said.

FYROM: Rumors Say Clinton To Propose Country Name

AU0804183196 Skopje MIC in English 8 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis left for Washington yesterday afternoon, where he will be meeting U.S. President Clinton tomorrow, MAKPRESS reports.

The talks will focus on the Greek-Turkish relations, the Cypriot question, especially Greece's role in the Balkan region, and the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] question is also expected to be mentioned.

According to diplomatic sources, it is assessed that Simitis's trip and talks with the highest U.S. officials is especially important, as they come at a time when the government has raised essential initiatives to resolve the Greek national questions. As to the Republic of Macedonia, prior to Simitis's visit to the U.S., it was not expected in Athens that the Greek side will have any problems with the efforts to solve the misunderstandings with the northern neighbor using some kind of compound name.

Quite the contrary, there is even information circling in Athens that during his meeting with Simitis, President Clinton will propose a plan for a double name, i.e. Nova Makedonija for international and the Republic of Macedonia for domestic use.

Aside from that, after the holding of the meeting of defence ministers of the southern Balkan countries, in which Greece did not take part, there is concerning information in Athens that "at the meeting, with the blessing of the United States, things are starting to roll for the formation of some kind of 'axis' on the line Albania-Macedonia-Bulgaria."

The statements by Defence Minister Blagoj Handziski were of no help here, who denied the existence of any kind of plan, but to the contrary—that the fact of the matter is the creation of a forum in which all the countries from the southern Balkans would become members of NATO or the "Partnership for Peace" program, whereby they could hold open discussions on the open regional questions, and create an atmosphere of mutual trust.

FYROM: Liberal Party Leader Views Gligorov Role

AU0804192696 Skopje MIC in English 8 Apr 96

[Interview with Stojan Andov, former Assembly chairman and leader of the Liberal Party, by an unidentified NOVA MAKEDONIJA correspondent; place and date not given: "Stojan Andov: Why Are They Afraid of New Elections"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] NOVA MAKEDONIJA: How do you view the opinions that you and your party are putting a lot of pressure on President Gligorov to arbitrate and to take sides, the side of the Liberals.

Andov: What we practically see is that all the time, the SDAM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] is putting pressure on President Gligorov. They are trying to make the president a common member of the SDAM, using all kinds of statements. They are saying that he is the best investment of the SDAM, that whoever votes for that and that representative of the SDAM, is actually voting for President Gligorov. That is a whole plan, a whole concept. We have never, not with one move, done anything that would mean misuse or ill-use of the president of state. We only oppose the concept of the "young group." That is also why our attitude toward the president of the Republic is to oppose them from making President Gligorov into a common soldier of SDAM, as that is political abuse. President Gligorov is not that, and as a candidate of three parties, he won the trust of a large number of citizens. He is not

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

behind the SDAM, he is behind all the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

It is certain that our country is going through enormous changes and processes which are not clear enough, as they can truly jeopardize the country's future development and the development of democracy. In the midst of such turbulent processes, there is political battle. In it, we all stick to some common ethnical standards. We expect the others to act at least similar to that.

NOVA MAKEDONIJA: Why do you promote the thesis that the situation (in the foreign politics) has deteriorated from the moment when the Liberals are no longer in the government.

Andov: Because I am familiar with the text of the draft-agreement (with the EU) which was drawn up before the election of the new government.

NOVA MAKEDONIJA: Can the pressure be overcome (by the international community) while the negotiations with the EU are ongoing? What do you predict?

Andov: I believe this government does not have that position and skills. Simply, the country will bear the consequences for having such a government. It is like that according to the international relations, and how the government will explain that inside the country, well, that's a different matter. The whole textile sector has been thrown out of the agreement, the transport protocol is gone, there are no guarantees of investments, in effect, an extremely bad agreement was given. I know that this government needs rapid success, so only in order to wave some kind of paper around, it can sign any kind of document, but that's not such a bad thing and the responsibility is general.

It's a question how much all of that can be remedied, because these agreement last at least five years, after which they are renewed. And, to change the status in the EU, that requires heavy negotiation. As much as I am informed, I believe that, to say the least, the people are not even aware what's going on. Truly, it is not good for me to remind, bu I am saying this, because I have experience recisely with the EU.

NOVA MAKEDONIJA: For one of the next sessions, you announced an initiative to form a Survey Commission for making public supplies. You propose an investigation into how three ministries, the defence, the police and finance, spent DM [German marks] 300 million. Why didn't you make this initiative while your ministers were still in the government?

Andov: That was initiated back in February, 1994, by Saso Stefkov. Then it was postponed, so the government instructed him to prepare a law. Then the government changed its stand and decided to draw up a decree. Stefkov prepared the decree and the prime minister said in an interview towards the end of November that the decree had already been made. Of course, the decree was not made then. But, in order to say that there are activities in that field, he said that it was made.

Although it was made in January, it is still not promulgated. We believe that whole matter is being sabotaged. First, the government refused to adopt a law and then it asked for a decree that can be made on the basis of the old laws which are not adapted to the market—which means everything will remain as it used to be. And, every minister who has a budget at his disposal will be able to implement his own policy and spend the budgetary means in his own way, which is contrary to the experiences of the western democracy. You saw how Villi Klas was replaced as NATO secretary general because of some of the concessions he made. Therefore, we have the right and the arguments to suspect abuse in the sphere of public supplies. How can one telephone exchange be supplied for DM35,000 in one organ, and for DM850,000 in another. The money belongs to the citizens. Do you know what it means to collect tax from someone? I don't know whether the Parliament will agree to form a survey commission. But, if it does allow it to be formed, it will show that one whole life is taking place and the citizens have no way of finding out what's going on there. Or, for instance, how will the citizens find out when some firms suddenly rise sky-high!?

NOVA MAKEDONIJA: Are there such firms among the Liberals?

Andov: It doesn't matter. If there are, let's find them. I don't think there are any. But, if there are, let's see what they have been doing, and let the people who are responsible answer for that. The responsibility is always personal, and the Commission is always a place the foundations can be given to see how things are being done, and then, the organs will be given the task to investigate the procedure.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Poland: Purpose of Kwasniewski's Visit to Moscow Considered

WS0904115396 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 9 Apr 96 p 1

[Article by Edward Krzemien: "Kwasniewski's Moscow Test"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Russians want Aleksander Kwasniewski to make a statement they could interpret as an easing of the Polish stance on NATO membership. The president began his visit to Moscow yesterday. [passage omitted]

What Does Russia Want?

Before the elections, President Yeltsin needs success in every possible field. The incongruity between Poland's and Russia's strategic interests causes that success to mean different things to Yeltsin and the Polish president.

It is Russia's intention to coerce the Polish president to make a statement that would be ambiguous enough to leave room for the interpretation that Poland has eased its rigid stance on NATO membership.

Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov has been repeating for some time that Russia opposes not the enlargement of NATO, but the approach of the alliance's military infrastructure to Russia's borders. This is a major point being raised by Russian diplomats.

A summit on nuclear security is scheduled to take place in Moscow in April, with the French president and the German chancellor attending. Russian analysts claim that this is the last opportunity for Yeltsin to develop a formula for a strategic agreement between Russia and NATO: political enlargement—yes; enlargement of the military structure—no. The new formula requires the West to cease strictly observing Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which provides NATO members with security guarantees.

This is where the greatest threat to the Polish president's visit lurks; he might make an official statement that could be interpreted as a slackening of Poland's rigid integration course.

Insulation Layer for Russia

Let us look at the most recent statements issued by Moscow: the issue of constructing a transit route to Kaliningrad via Poland; media reports on attacks on trains going through Poland from Russia to the West.

Perhaps Russia is trying to draw attention to the fact that for transit and strategic reasons Poland is part of an insulation layer surrounding the Russian Federation.

This signal is by no means addressed to Warsaw, Vilnius, or Minsk. It is clearly being sent out in consideration of further relations between Russia and NATO.

It should be pointed out that Primakov has said that this is a very special time; the procedure of admitting new members to NATO is on hold for a period of one year, and this is a time granted to Russia. Russia seems to be thinking it is either now or never.

What Moscow finds most aggravating is the fact that the process of NATO enlargement is moving forward—slowly and sluggishly, but forward. Halting this process, or at least altering its course, is a top priority for Russian diplomats.

What Does Poland Want?

The Polish president is going to Moscow with a message that in itself is not addressed exclusively to the Russians. Kwasniewski should demonstrate that regardless of the strategic incongruity of Polish and Russian interests, Poland is capable of continuing a dialogue with Russia, even at the highest level.

The visit should prove wrong anyone who claims that Poland does not want friendly relations with Russia and that it is a potential source of conflict in this part of Europe.

The problem is, not unlike in the overall relations between Poland and Russia,that Poland has a very minor influence on whether this plan will succeed. Russia holds the key. Russia can afford to decide whether it will break off or disrupt the dialogue. There is not really much we can do.

Kwasniewski's Foreign Policy

All of this means that Aleksander Kwasniewski's current visit is the most difficult to date. [passage omitted]

One should hope that President Kwasniewski will rise to the challenge. It is encouraging that he consulted about the main theses of his visit with heads of all of the parliamentary clubs—a novelty in Polish politics—and that he invited Bronislaw Geremek, an opposition leader, to accompany him.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Poland: ROP Demands Report After President's Moscow Trip

WS0904123396 Warsaw GAZETA SWIATECZNA in Polish 6-8 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by "DOM": "Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland on President's Visit to Russia; Controlled Diplomacy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "People who belong to the governing coalition are burdened with the high treason charge. Therefore, in order to obtain credibility, Aleksander Kwasniewski and his ministers should inform the public in detail about their intentions regarding the visit to Moscow," reads a statement issued by the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP].

"Foreign Economic Cooperation Minister Jacek Buchacz claims that the problem of the delivery of Russian-made military hardware is a commercial issue. According to him, making our defense industry permanently dependent on Russia is of no political importance. National Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski proposes that Russia build up its relations with us in the area of training military cadres. All of this is happening in a situation where proving to our future Western allies that Russia no longer has any influence on Polish military structures is one of the basic preconditions of letting Poland in on NATO's strategic secrets," reads the ROP statement, signed by Piotr Naimski.

ROP stresses that Poland must have good relations with Russia, but this must not mean that we should become dependent on it. ROP demands that the draft agreements and reports be presented to the public after the Moscow talks are held.

On Thursday [4 April], President Kwasniewski met with the chairmen of all of the opposition parliamentary clubs to discuss the goals of the Moscow visit. He gave assurances that he would not submit "anything new on NATO" in Moscow. However, he failed to present the draft agreements that are to be signed with the Russians.

Poland: Daily Views Walesa's U.S. Visit, Schedule

WS0904124196 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 5 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by "PAD": "Lech Walesa in the United States; Lectures and Thomas Jefferson Day"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During his visit to the United States, which is due to begin on Tuesday [9 April], Lech Walesa will deliver five lectures—among other places, at Harvard. In Virginia he will be the main protagonist on Thomas Jefferson Day, one of the Founding Fathers. It is also possible that he will meet with President Bill Clinton.

The enterprisse that is organizing the trip of the former president is the Washington Speakers Bureau. "This company has been selected from among 10 others that made offers," RZECZPOSPOLITA was told by Andrzej Ananicz, secretary of state for foreign affairs during Lech Walesa's term and currently a member of the board of the Lech Walesa Institute Foundation. The Washington-based agency will permanently act on behalf of the former Polish president in the United States. Other people with whom it deals with include George Bush, Colin Powell, Margaret Thatcher, and Bishop Desmond Tutu. The other organizer of Walesa's visit is the Jefferson Foundation.

On Wednesday [10 April], the former president will visit New England and the University of Connecticut. On Thursday he will go to Boston and to Northeastern University, as well as to the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. Friday will be devoted to the celebration of Thomas Jefferson Day. One of the Founding Fathers lived in Lynchburg, Virginia, and a Jefferson festival is held every year in this town. This year's main protagonist of Thomas Jefferson Day is to be Lech Walesa, who will deliver a speech in front of 2,000 people. In each town he visits, he will meet with Polonia communities and local authorities, as well as give interviews to the media. Visits to the universities involve delivering lectures and holding discussions with students.

"In the United States, I will talk about the role Poland played in overthrowing communism and the Iron Curtain. I will stress the necessity of fast integration with NATO," Walesa told RZECZPOSPOLITA. "If possible, I will try to find an investor for the Gdansk Shipyard."

A few days before the visit it is still not certain whether Walesa will meet with President Bill Clinton. In line with unofficial information, the White House is interested in arranging such a meeting. The problem, however, is the date. "Currently such a meeting is not planned," RZECZPOSPOLITA was told on Thursday by Susan Cleary, deputy press attache of the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw.

Unless the meeting is held in April, Walesa will meet with the U.S. president during one of his next visits to the United States. The next one is scheduled for the second half of May, when Walesa will go to the United States to collect the "Path to Peace" award, granted by the Vatican's nuncio in Washington and at the UN.

Lech Walesa's visit coincides with the presidential election campaign in the United States. "I am not a

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

voter in the United States," said Walesa during a news conference on Tuesday [2 April], when asked whom he liked more, the Republican or the Democratic candidate. The former president will deliver some of his lectures without charge. It is not known how much money the Lech Walesa Institute will receive for the paid lectures. On Tuesday Walesa asked not to demand too much. "Some politicians get more than I do. However, I am not the president of a nuclear superpower," Walesa stressed.

Poland: NBP: Foreign Banks Not Allowed To Open Offices

WS0904130696 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6-8 Apr 96 pp 1, 19

[Article by M. Ign.: "Branch Offices of Russian Banks in Poland; Without Consulting NBP"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The government's plans regarding the opening of two branch offices of Russian banks in Poland, which Foreign Economic Cooperation Minister Jacek Buchacz talked about after his talks with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Davydov, were not discussed with the National Bank of Poland [NBP]. The central bank is still saying that it will not grant foreign banks permission to open their branch offices in Poland.

Unofficial information indicates that the government is considering another option—establishing a mixed-capital bank that would operate in both countries. At the Information Center of the Office of the Council of Ministers, we were only informed that the issue of opening Russian banks in Poland "will not be one of the topics discussed at the next session of the government." [passage omitted]

"The central bank has not changed its policy in this area. Branch offices of foreign banks will not be opened in Poland; we will only allow the opening of banks that are set up as shareholders' companies and that operate according to Polish law," RZECZPOSPOLITA was told by NPB Press Spokeswoman Renata Wisniewska. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Romania: PD's Severin: Policy Hinders Entry Into NATO

AU0504172596 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 29 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by Ana Cristina Litescu: "If Those in Power Continue With the Current Policy, Romania Will Enter Another Sphere of Influence Than That of NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Social Democratic Union is in the forefront of those who wish to speed up the process of Romania's European and Euro-Atlantic integration, Deputy Adrian Severin [Democratic Party, PD, vice president], head of the PD electoral campaign, said yesterday, 28 March. However, Severin mentioned that, in the current situation of endemic corruption that is prevailing in our country, a phenomenon that has become "the ruling system in our state," Romania cannot be admitted into NATO and the European Union. The Democratic deputy emphasized the need for integration, also because "alarming phenomena are taking place in our vicinity." Adrian Severin referred specifically to the decision of the Russian State Duma declaring null and void the dissolution of the USSR and mentioned that the PD was the only party in Romania that reacted immediately to this decision. Answering the question of the daily AZI regarding the possibility that Romania might enter Russia's sphere of influence if our country is not admitted into NATO with the first wave, Mr. Adrian Severin said: "The geostrategic position represents an important argument, however, it is only in cooperation with other factors that are connected with a healthy democracy, a healthy economy, and an efficient public morale, that one might fulfill the NATO requirements. Each state that is a candidate for integration into NATO will be treated according to its own achievements. I do not believe that if Romania remains outside the NATO borders, then this automatically means that it enters another sphere of influence. However, if Romania continues to promote the same policy, then our country will remain in an area of political uncertainty, might enter another sphere of influence, or might turn into a buffer state, where experiments on crisis solving will be carried out."

Also regarding Romania's foreign policy, Deputy Adrian Severin expressed satisfaction with the ratification by the Slovak Parliament of the basic political treaty between Bratislava and Budapest. He mentioned that the ratification of this document means encouragement for the political forces in Romania that wish for a fortunate settlement of relations with the neighbors and, at the same time, it represents a blow to the forces that considered this nonratification as support against the finalization of the Romanian-Hungarian basic political treaty. Adrian Severin emphasized that the Judicial Commission of the Council of Europe—the Romanian deputy is one of its members—will meet on 3 April and will examine the notice of the Commission regarding democracy through the right to Recommendation 1201.

Romania: RMDSZ Chairman on Party Issues, Autonomy

AU0904090896 Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 6 Apr 96 pp 49-50

[Interview with RMDSZ Chairman Bela Marko by Istvan Riba; place and date not given: "There Is No Sense Whatsoever in Signing a Formal Treaty"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Riba] For a long time, you have been regarded as someone who plays a balancing role between the radical and moderate politicians of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian]. However, you repeatedly got involved in debates with the radical side during the past year. Does this mean that the sensitive balance within the RMDSZ has been upset?

[Marko] There are several ideological platforms in the RMDSZ, but the positions regarding the issues of ethnic Hungarians in Romania are less ideological; instead, they are connected to the interest-representation goals of the RMDSZ. Obviously, my center position is less firm when one feels platform sympathy in the statements of strong personalities, like the RMDSZ honorary president [reference to Bishop Laszlo Tokes]. Besides, I cannot accept the above delimitation of radical and moderate, and not because the attribute radical carries a positive image and the attribute moderate carries a negative image in Transylvania, but because, in my view, it is impossible to decide from the outset whether to be more radical or more moderate in our policy: The prevailing circumstances determine the way that is justified. Given the fact that there is a basic consensus in the RMDSZ regarding our strategic goals, the present debates are about the way to achieve these goals. [passage omitted]

[Riba] Rumor has it that, in order to clarify the balance of power within the RMDSZ, you have been planning elections among the ethnic Hungarians living in Romania for quite some time. When is this due, and what is at stake?

[Marko] Indeed, the issue of internal elections has been dragging on for quite some time; in addition, given the local government elections scheduled for this spring and the parliamentary elections scheduled for this autumn, I am not sure we will have time to hold the planned internal elections. There have been debates on what sources to use to make up the list of ethnic Hungarians

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

living in Romania, and we finally decided to use the 500,000 RMDSZ members as the basis of the electoral lists. Our goal is to directly elect the Council of Federal Representatives [SZKT], and thus this body would lose its corporate nature. Individual candidates and platforms could run in the elections, and thus we will have a more clear picture of the ideological affiliation of the ethnic Hungarians living in Transylvania.

[Riba] In January 1996, the RMDSZ issued a statement that, in this election year, Bucharest interpreted as an offer to participate in a government coalition. Was there any basis for this interpretation? What are the RMDSZ's relations with the Romanian parties like?

[Marko] The statement did not contain an offer, but it did contain a message to the Romanian political parties. We expressed our readiness to cooperate if we come across a program that suits us. According to our position for the local government body elections, we exclude even the possibility of local cooperation with three extremist parties, but we do not exclude such cooperation with Iliescu's government party and the opposition parties. [passage omitted]

[Riba] One cannot hear any positive opinion from the Romanian side regarding any form of autonomy urged by the RMDSZ: neither the so called personal, local self-government autonomy nor the territorial autonomy. Moreover, the autonomy issue is one of the main faultlines within the RMDSZ itself. At the SZKT meeting in January, you only decided to work out the personal autonomy concept in detail. Have you given up territorial autonomy?

[Marko] Many different conflicts emerged within the RMDSZ on the autonomy issue and, therefore, we could only advance slowly toward a consensus, but there is no longer a real faultline. If we had only been a political party, the formulation of a detailed concept would not have lasted six years, but coordination is much more difficult in a pluralistic organization like the RMDSZ. Hungarians living in one bloc have a different approach to autonomy than ethnic Hungarians living as a national minority. Western Europeans would like to determine the norms and criteria according to which we should think, but our position is that the generally accepted European norms are only the minimum. There are autonomy solutions in Europe like South Tyrol in Italy or Catalan autonomy in Spain, and we refer to them when we present our autonomy concepts to western Europeans. The favorite Romanian example, the French solution, is unacceptable for us because it is the typical case of a national state.

[Riba] The Slovak Parliament in Bratislava ratified the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty last week, but it added an interpretation that signals the fact that this document will not bring any positive changes in the situation of ethnic Hungarians living there. In view of all this, what do you expect from the ongoing negotiations on the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty?

[Marko] Everyone should draw certain lessons from the history of the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty. The Romanian Government issued optimistic statements on the imminent signing of the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty, while the Romanian Parliament was legislating laws that reduce even our existing rights. At the moment, I see no reason for the Hungarian Government to sign a basic treaty that does not provide any means of settling the situation of ethnic Hungarians living in Romania. There is no sense whatsoever in signing a formal basic treaty. It would be incorrect on the part of the basic treaty to declare that the relations between the two countries are in order, and the problems will be solved in due course. First of all, the ethnic Hungarians living in Transylvania should agree with the basic treaty. In addition, we would like to see that it accepts autonomy, at least in accordance with Recommendation 1201 of the Council of Europe. Concrete solutions should also be incorporated in the basic treaty, like the full development of the network of mother-tongue education, the use of one's mother tongue in public institutions and the administration of justice, or the return of church property. Of course, the treaty should provide adequate guarantees for the implementation of all these demands.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Slovenia: Drnovsek, Party Leaders Discuss Policy on EU

AU0504164396 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 5 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Drnovsek met with the presidents of the parliamentary parties this morning. As he said at the news conference after the talks, which were closed to the public, they reached a minimum consensus on the issues connected to Slovenia's rapprochement with the European Union. Here is a report by Nadja Pengov:

[Begin recording] [Pengov] Considerable differences exist in the State Chamber regarding this issue and therefore today's meeting. The intention was to find a way out because the questions involved are, according to Drnovsek, of long-term importance for our country. The talks were attended by the presidents of all parliamentary parties, two of them—the National Party and the Slovene Christian Democrats—sent their deputy presidents due to the absence of the presidents. The debate was frank, according to the prime minister:

[Drnovsek] The debate was intensive and lasted for quite some time. I would assess it as sufficiently constructive. The notion prevailed that this was a national issue, an issue that is truly more important than the short-term political goals of individual parties.

[Pengov] The prime minister will again meet with the presidents of the parliamentary parties on Wednesday evening, which means that the State Chamber will resume the extraordinary session on Thursday [12 April]. The time in between should be used for the talks within the parties, where they should try to find a solution. According to Drnovsek, this solution is a wider consensus of all parliamentary parties on the integration of Slovenia into the European Union. When asked whether some progress was made today, Drnovsek replied that he did not expect any after the first round of talks, but his duty as prime minister was to point out the consequences of the parliament voting against the Spanish proposal, which could be the secret desire of Italy, which would, in this way, prove to the world that Slovenia rejects the European rules of the game. [end recording]

Slovenia: Kucan Views Yugoslav Succession, Italy

AU0904115896 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 9 Apr 96 p 8

[Interview with Slovene President Milan Kucan by Bernhard Kueppers; place and date not given: "The Slovenes' Existence Was Threatened"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kueppers] Slovenia recognized the FRY immediately after the parties to the Bosnian war made peace. An agreement on Yugoslavia's legal succession is still missing, however.

[Kucan] Recognition does not mean that diplomatic relations will be assumed immediately. For Slovenia, it continues to hold true that the old state crumbled, that all former republics are successor states with equal rights, and that the FRY cannot claim such a status for itself alone. Succession is a matter of negotiations, and we continue to oppose linking peace negotiations to negotiations about succession. All the former Yugoslav republics should settle the issue of succession by themselves without interference from the international community, if this is possible.

[Kueppers] Bilaterally? At a conference?

[Kucan] At a conference with a very specific goal.

[Kueppers] The disagreement about the legal succession was virtually the ideological core of the Yugoslav war. Is Belgrade beginning to deal more pragmatically with its claim to sole legal succession because it wants to be integrated into Europe?

[Kucan] We want all states in the Balkans, including the Balkan republics of the former Yugoslavia, to be given the prospect of integration into Europe. However, the same conditions should be valid for everyone. If, however, someone tries to buy peace, to bribe Belgrade, and to spare it certain conditions, then instability in the Balkans will be preserved. This is also true—if one looks a bit further—for dealing with Zagreb.

[Kueppers] Does your criticism of peace at the cost of principles also refer to the Dayton agreements?

[Kucan] No, Dayton is a great achievement. It interrupted the war. Afterwards, however, Belgrade received vague promises that it would be permitted to take the seat of the former Yugoslavia in the international organizations. Regarding diplomatic relations, too, it is pretended that this is a continuation of those relations that existed with the former Yugoslavia and not new relations with a new state. I see one reason for that in the fact that one does not want to recognize the real character of the war against Bosnia, in particular at its

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

beginning, and puts the responsibility of aggressor and defender on the same level.

[Kueppers] You were in Sarajevo recently. How do you assess the implementation of Dayton?

[Kucan] The most important thing is ending the war with the help of IFOR [Implementation Force]. I see the main weakness in the fact that pressure from the outside cannot be a substitute for the lack of internal forces that are trying to reintegrate Bosnia. There is also insufficient civilian implementation of Dayton, which should unite Bosnia across the dividing lines not only politically, but also economically and legally, and should reconstruct a multicultural area.

[Kueppers] Why have border issues and other problems remained disputed between Slovenia and Croatia for such a long time?

[Kucan] So far Croatia has been involved in the war. Slovenia and Croatia have, however, found a pragmatic approach so as not to permit the open questions to make life on both sides of the border more difficult.

[Kueppers] How do you see yourself as one of the acting persons in the crumbling of Yugoslavia and in the period leading up to the war?

[Kucan] Yugoslavia, as it was at the end of the 1980's, threatened the existence of the Slovene people by granting it neither democratic nor economic development. I was able to participate in decisions in Belgrade and Ljubljana. Slovenia was lucky enough that the official policy and the opposition were striving for the same goal.

[Kueppers] If Milosevic had not risen to power in Belgrade, would it have been possible for the state to remain whole?

[Kucan] Reforms would have been possible. However, they would not have been able to preserve Yugoslavia as it was then. In addition, the division of Europe into blocs ceased to exist. In Germany, things that belonged together were put together. In the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, those things that did not belong together broke apart. However, this could also have happened without a war in Yugoslavia despite the attempt to turn it into a Serb area. Timely intervention by the international community, together with the recognition of independent Slovenia and the recognition that Yugoslavia had crumbled, could have ensured peaceful separation.

[Kueppers] Does Slovenia get enough support from Bonn, in your view?

[Kucan] We know the German position very well and appreciate it. I have never felt that Bonn favors Slovenia. During the entire Yugoslav crisis, Germany acted very much on the basis of its principles, in our view, and supported the people's right to self-determination and to a peaceful solution. Bonn is supporting Slovenia with the search for peace in the Balkans and also in line with its own ideas of a future in the EU. Slovenia's policy toward Bonn should be more consistent. There should not be the impression that Slovenia wants to involve its friends among the countries in quarrels with its neighbors.

[Kueppers] Do you, like some Slovenes, doubt that your country will get into the EU? After all, Italy is still blocking Slovenia's association with the EU with its claims to property that seemed to have been settled at the time of Yugoslavia.

[Kucan] I was and remain a realist regarding our path into the EU. In the referendum (at the end of 1990) the Slovenes did not decide in favor of independence to live in isolation but to integrate themselves into Europe. The Slovenes' skepticism comes from the EU's solidarity with Italy, which they see as solidarity with an unjust demand.

[Kueppers] The forthcoming elections in Italy could make the conclusion of the long initialed association treaty with the EU easier, but the months until the Slovene elections in November might delay it.

[Kucan] The time before elections is certainly not conducive to decisions. Many opportunities have already been missed. Slovenia should dispel all doubts about its intentions in Brussels and adjust its laws to the European laws as quickly as possible, particularly laws pertaining to property rights. This would also make it clear how absurd the Italian position is. My optimism regarding the Italian elections is based on the wide range of common interests between Slovenia and its third-largest trading partners; in addition, there is the conviction that those political forces in Italy that historically distort all relations with Slovenia and see it only through the glasses of the extreme optants (those Italians who left the areas that fell to Yugoslavia and thus to Slovenia after the war) will remain in a minority.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Federal

FRY: 'Text' of Communique on Signing of FYROM Accord

LD0804125396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1056 GMT 8 Apr 96

["Pool" item; quotation marks as received]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 8 (TANJUG)—The following is the integral text of the communique on the signing on Monday [8 April] of the agreement on the regulation of relations and the promotion of cooperation between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the republic of Macedonia [the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

"The federal minister for foreign affairs, Milan Milutinovic, and the minister for foreign affairs of the republic of Macedonia, Ljubomir Frckovski, signed the agreement on the regulation of relations and the promotion of cooperation between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the republic of Macedonia in Belgrade today.

By this act, the two sides expressed the deepest interests of their peoples to live in peace, mutual understanding and good-neighbourliness. the FR [Federal Republic] of Yugoslavia and the republic of Macedonia render in this way an important contribution to the strengthening of the peace process, as well as to the building of confidence, stability and good-neighbourliness in the Balkans and Europe.

By the signing of this agreement, the FR of Yugoslavia and the republic of Macedonia establish full diplomatic relations at the level of ambassadors and create conditions for a comprehensive development of mutual relations and cooperation.

The two countries agreed to build their relations on the principles of equality, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, in accordance with the principles of the charter of the United Nations and the document of the organization of security and cooperation in europe.

The republic of Macedonia accepted the state continuity and international legal personality of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. An agreement was also achieved that the FR of Yugoslavia and the republic of Macedonia solve the question of the succession of the previous Yugoslavia by agreement.

Particular emphasis was placed on the interest of the two countries in strengthening and intensifying economic cooperation in all fields. It was agreed to begin immediate negotiations on concluding an agreement on economic cooperation and trade, aimed at developing comprehensive and mutually beneficial economic and trade relations. The two sides will solve by agreement, on the basis of reciprocity, also the question of physical persons and legal entities.

Agreement was reached on the promotion of road, rail and air traffic, of PTT and other communications, as well as on mutual restraint from imposing any impediments to the movement of people and goods between the two countries. Cooperation has been envisaged in the field of health, preservation and protection of the environment and, in particular, in the elimination of all forms of transboundary pollution and the coordination of strategies and programmes for regional and international cooperation in the field of the protection of the environment," said the communique in conclusion.

FRY: Kontic Satisfied With FYROM Agreement

LD0804160096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1551 GMT 8 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 8 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic expressed satisfaction with the normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and the [Former Yugoslav] Republic of Macedonia in a talk with Macedonian Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckoski here Monday [8 April].

Kontic said he was convinced the agreement signed Monday on the regulation of relations and the promotion of cooperation between the two countries would significantly help stabilize peace, confidence and cooperation in the Balkans, a federal government statement said.

Under the agreement, the two countries have established full diplomatic relations.

The two sides agreed that all necessary conditions existed for a rapid, comprehensive and intensive development of Yugoslav-Macedonian cooperation, especially economic, the statement said.

Kontic said the two economies were highly complementary and could successfully cooperate thanks, among other things, to good transportaton links between the two countries.

He said the value of Yugoslav-Macedonian economic cooperation could quickly reach one billion dollars.

The agreement signed here Monday has positively reverberated in Macedonia, where there have been no anti-Serb sentiments since the outbreak of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, Macedonian Foreign Minister Frckoski said.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The two sides agreed to open top-level political dialogue with a view to strengthening and furthering Yugoslav-Macedonian relations.

Inter-state agreements on economic cooperation and trade, guarantees for capital investments, scientific-technical and cultural-educational cooperation, the protection of the human environment, sports and other domains are to be drawn up.

The two sides agreed that, in the spirit of the traditional friendship, the Yugoslav-Macedonian border be a border of good-neighbourly relations and all-round cooperation in the common interest, the federal goverment statement said.

Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic aiso attended the meeting.

FRY: Milutinovic: Macedonia Accord To Enhance Stability

LD0804130496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1231 GMT 8 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 8 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic said Monday [8 April] that an agreement signed earlier in the day between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Macedonia on regulating regulations was their contribution to strengthening peace in the former Yugoslavia, the Balkans and Europe.

Addressing reporters after the signing ceremony at the federal government building in Belgrade, Milutinovic said he was confident that Yugoslav-Macedonian relations faced a great future because of spiritual closeness between the two peoples and a large number of interests the two states had in common.

'It is our determination to build our relations on the principles of equality, non-interference in internal affairs, respect of sovereignty, territorial integrity and mutual interests,' he said.

Milutinovic said by signing the agreement, Macedonia had shown that it respected the state continuity of Yugoslavia, this being a question of principle for Yugoslavia, and a significant choice for Macedonia.

'We have also agreed to deal with the succession issue through agreements, which will make it easier to find a final solution to this complex issue,' he said.

By establishing full diplomatic relations at the level of ambassadors, the two countries will create conditions for a broad communication and will set up intensive dialogue and contacts, he said .

Macedonian Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckoski said the two countries had regulated basic relations in a normal and dignified manner, and said the agreement would open a new page in the history of the two countries' relations.

Frckoski said the agreement was also a considerable contribution to cooperation and prosperity in the region.

He said there was yet a lot to be done, because the agreement provided for a series of bilateral agreements on cooperation in the spheres of economy, culture and transport as well as in the sphere of foreign policy.

FRY: Milutinovic, FYROM's Frckovski Welcome Accord

AU0804161896 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 8 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] After signing the agreement on regulating relations and furthering cooperation between the FRY and the Republic of Macedonia [Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], Foreign Ministers Miomir Milutinovic and Ljubomir Frckovski addressed journalists. Jugoslava Zagorac reports:

[Begin recording] [Zagorac] Minister Milutinovic pointed out that the FRY and the Republic of Macedonia share a joint stand that mutual relations should be built up on the principles of equality, noninterference, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as mutual interests.

Addressing journalists, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic said the following:

[Milutinovic] This date is significant for both of our countries. Today we normalized our relations in formal sense. Since the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, these relations have in fact been effectively normal, that is, de facto normal, so to speak. Today they are made de jure normal.

The agreement is rather all-encompassing and virtually envisages everything that should be done in the coming period regarding relations between our two countries. We have created a firm basis for all that and I would like to stress in particular that with this agreement we have established that the Republic of Macedonia accepts the state and legal continuity of Yugoslavia, as well as that the questions and problems regarding the succession will be solved through agreement, which is in fact in the spirit of normal relations between two countries, so to speak, and today we have achieved this officially as well.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Zagorac] Thanking his hosts for their welcome, Ljubomir Frckovski, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, pointed out the following:

[Frckovski, in Macedonian with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] We have concluded a very important job regulating basic relations between the FRY and the Republic of Macedonia. This agreement contributes to the stabilization of relations and development of the entire region. The agreement implies rich and comprehensive cooperation in all spheres, ranging from the economy, trade, and transport to the international policy of the two countries. Moreover, this (?act) is significant for stimulating regional cooperation in this suffering region. I wish both sides, the Yugoslav and the Macedonian, much happiness and success in the coming period. [end recording]

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic Meets Macedonian Foreign Minister

LD0804151096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1304 GMT 8 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 8 April (TANJUG)—In Karadjordjevo today Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic met Ljubomir Frckoski, foreign minister of the Republic of Macedonia, and Federal [Yugoslav] Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic.

The talks, conducted in a cordial atmosphere, underlined the importance of developing stable and good-neighbourly relations between the two countries, as well as mutual interest in the accelerated promotion and successful development of comprehensive cooperation.

The two men noted with pleasure that the full normalization of the two neighboring countries' ties was an important element for overall stability in the region, and that the building of mutual trust between the peoples and countries of the Balkans would make the best contribution to the strengthening of peace and economic progress.

Serbia: Socialist Party Hails Treaty With FYROM

LD0804195096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1947 GMT 8 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 8 (TANJUG)—The treaty regulating relations between Yugoslavia and Macedonia [the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] is an important contribution to bilateral cooperation and the promotion of goodneighborliness in the Balkans, Serbia's ruling Socialist Party said Monday.

A statement issued by the party's main board said that the treaty paved the way for a new era in relations between Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) and the Republic of Macedonia, based on friendship, a traditional closeness and numerous common interests.

Serbia: Further on SPS Comment on Treaty With FYROM

LD0804201196 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1835 GMT 8 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 8 Apr (TANJUG)—The Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] has described the agreement on regulating relations and advancing cooperation between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and the [Former Yugoslav] Republic of Macedonia as a key contribution toward creating conditions for good-neighborly relations between the two states, based on the principles of equality, noninterference in internal affairs, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the two people's common interest to live in peace and understanding.

According to a statement issued by the information service of the SPS main committee, the SPS believes that the signing of the agreement is yet another major contribution to strengthening the peace process in the territory of former Yugoslavia and promoting economic cooperation between the two states and in the whole of the Balkans, which is very important for the development of every state in the region.

Thus, a basis has been created for the beginning of a new period in relations between the FRY and the Republic of Macedonia and our peoples, on the permanent basis of mutual friendship, traditional closeness, numerous common interests, and comprehensive cooperation in the interest of strengthening peace and stability in the region as a whole.

Serbia: Tasks of Economic Chamber President Viewed

96BA0193A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 16 Feb 96 p 24

[Article by Milivoje Glisic: "Along the Lines of Positions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The president of the Economic Chamber of Serbia, Vlajko Stojiljkovic, wants more a concrete definition of responsibility.*

Pozarevac, that inexhaustible reservoir of personnel, has indebted this country, and there is justified hope that it will continue to indebt it. For example, the latest to flow from that personnel reservoir is Mr. Vlajko Stojiljkovic, the president of the Economic Chamber of

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Serbia and a key figure after Dayton. Why is he key? Because after the lifting of the sanctions, our market will certainly flourish, and our products will also flourish on the European market. Vlajko is the man for Europe.

(Here I would ask, parenthetically: What will we do in Europe, when Europe is already here? And the United States, i.e., IFOR [Implementation Force]!)

(Just wondering.)

Exporting is a national mission, we were reminded by Vlajko Stojiljkovic, and that is why Mirko Marjanovic and Slobodan Radulovic have been allowed to export wheat. In the national interest, of course.

Mr. Stojiljkovic warned all structures that exporting food is of strategic importance to the Serbian nation back at the session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia [CKSKS] on 28 January 1988, when he was also drawing close to the pinnacle of state power. Mr. Vlajko said at that time that even in agriculture there is no alternative to self-management and that the League of Communists is responsible for eliminating, through resolute social action, fluctuations and inconsistencies in the adoption of measures of current and developmental economic policy in order to establish, as soon as possible, the necessary conditions for stable agricultural production in accordance with the Long-Term Program of Economic Stabilization. We are obligated, Vlajko said, to provide a fully concrete definition of this responsibility along the lines of the positions adopted by the Eighth Session of the CKSKS, critically and objectively assessing everyone's work and output, especially the work and conduct of us communists in the most responsible positions, from the basic cooperative organization to the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Assembly.

Despite Vlajko's words, however, the responsibility was not concretely defined, not even along the lines of the positions adopted at the Eighth Session.

When he was once again elected president of the chamber two months ago, Mr. Stojiljkovic complained openly:

"The source of our disagreements with the monetary authorities was the unjustified tolerance of the lack of financial discipline, tolerance of the major role of issued money in illegal channels, and our failure to implement our own decision to direct a large share of total bank credits, as much as 80 percent, into industry and agriculture."

The newspapers (the opposition ones, of course) are reporting, however, that Mr. Stojiljkovic is saying one thing but doing something else: that in conjunction with some ministers he is quietly attempting to thwart the second program of Governor Avramovic. The necessary money is being brought in, but where are they getting the money if it is not being printed! The Topcider Printing Shop has a rosy future ahead of it.

The most illustrious Serbian grandfather is, for now, successfully locked in struggle with the best Serbian economists. For now, I say.

Today Milan Panic, the same person whom Vlajko Stojiljkovic recommended to Slobodan Milosevic, is ungratefully saying that Serbian politicians are training for control over the people by maintaining control over the economy. He has disappointed Stojiljkovic. Back in 1992, Stojiljkovic said that results from Panic's extensive activity were insufficiently discernible. But we are working, Stojiljkovic added, on preserving a market atmosphere in which the capabilities and businesslike manner of economic subjects can find expression.

In this sense, and in keeping with stabilization, Mr. Vlajko Stojiljkovic proposed a greater increase in the price of electricity (46 percent) than the electric power industry sought (42.7 percent). He also sat down and wrote a letter to Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic saying that electricity in Montenegro is more expensive than in Serbia. In addition to this irrefutable argument, Stojiljkovic also made recommendations on how the money should be spent. He said: "Revenues earned on the basis of this increase should be posted separately and spent on settling obligations toward creditors—contractors and equipment suppliers." A second instruction: "We also believe that one of the top priorities, besides harmonizing prices, is the formulation of consolidation programs and of programs for a rational organization of EPS [Electric Power Distribution Enterprise of Serbia]."

I do not understand much about economics, but I do see that the malicious press immediately reacted to that with hostility. As if Vlajko is rooting for someone's royalties. The malicious press says that EPS specialists and experts from various industries have thus far drawn up several programs and plans for transformation and reorganization, but that nothing has been transformed and reorganized.

Firm in his positions, Vlajko Stojiljkovic even aroused the anger of Bogoljub Karic last year. He said that Karic Bank was the main culprit in the growth of the black market exchange rate, while Karic Bank responded that it has not done and will not do anything to destabilize Avramovic's program, nor is it involved in illegal transactions with foreign exchange. On the contrary, Karic Bank believes that such statements serve exclusively to conceal the actual culprits! And that is why Karic Bank announced that it was bringing libel

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

charges against Vlajko Stojiljkovic, in which it would seek moral and material damages of one million dinars.

Nothing ever came of that.

Since Mr. Vlajko Stojiljkovic is a compatriot of Dr. Mira Markovic, and it is known what Dr. Mira Markovic thinks of Dr. Dragoslav Avramovic, it is clear whose side Vlajko will be on. On the right one.

Let us not forget that Mr. Stojiljkovic adores railroads (he likes to travel by rail), something that the railroads can appreciate. Recently, in fact, he was awarded the CIP [expansion unknown] Grand Medallion. In presenting this prestigious medal to Stojiljkovic, the general director of the CIP Transportation Institute, Milutin Mrkonjic, emphasized that Vlajko is not only a loyal and sincere friend of the railroad, but also very constructive and helpful "in the cooperation between and unification of all branches of industry in the republic, including the railroads."

Loyalty and sincerity work both ways.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Djukanovic on Dissatisfaction With Federation

LD0804182196 Belgrade FONET in Serbo-Croatian 1653 GMT 8 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 8 Apr (FONET)—"The situation in the federal state is unsatisfactory, primarily because its institutions are not operating in accordance with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," Montenegrin Premier Milo Djukanovic said in an interview for SRPSKA REC.

According to FONET reporter Radovan Miljanic, Djukanovic devoted most of the interview to Prevlaka [peninsula, disputed with Croatia], privatization, Montenegro's equal status in the federation, the foreign policies of the federal state and Montenegro, and Slobodan Milosevic.

The current diplomatic activity of the federal state, mainly turned towards the Far East, Djukanovic described as "learning geography at the expense of the state."

"We must concentrate our foreign policy efforts on Washington and West European centers," Djukanovic said and added that Montenegro had two foreign policy priorities: its neighbors, Albania and Italy, as well as the former Yugoslav republics, and the European Union—with a hope to become its fully fledged member—and the advancement of ties with the United States to a much higher level than today.

The rights of the Serb people have been more or less successfully defined, Djukanovic said, and the federal government should now take full responsibility for the conducting of internal and foreign policy.

Speaking about privatization, Djukanovic said: "The story of two economic systems is a complete illusion."

Montenegro: Disputes With Serbia Over Airports Viewed

96BA0222A Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 96 pp 8-9

[Article by Branka Plamenac: "Who Will Be the Owner of the Podgorica and Tivat Airports?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A question which recently has been posed more and more frequently in Montenegro—Who owns the Podgorica and Tivat airports?—will soon, it seems, be answered—at the March session of the Republic Assembly. From circles close to the top leadership of the DPS [Democratic Party of Socialists], we have learned that the question of the ownership status of these two Montenegrin airports will be on the agenda of the first Assembly session. It sounds absurd, but it is true that the Podgorica and Tivat airports have been proclaimed state property of the Republic of Serbia and they are being run at the moment by JAT [Yugoslav Airline]. It is therefore expected that the Assembly of Montenegro, in order to protect the interests of the state, will adopt a decision proclaiming the airports general and national property and transform them into public enterprises of the Republic of Montenegro.

That or some similar decision is one of the indispensable preconditions for the anticipated start-up of the Montenegrin aviation company Montenegro Airlines, which, as matters now stand, would be put in an untenable situation not only of seeking permits from JAT to park its first plane, but JAT would also be determining the positions of its own flight schedule, putting conditions for opening the intended destinations to which it would fly, and many other "trifles." In addition to all that, the Montenegrins would have to pay JAT all airport services and landing and takeoff fees for Montenegrin Airlines planes at airports in their own republic, just as they do at Surcin.

How, in fact, did JAT become the owner of the Montenegrin airports?

Until September '94, when the first article on this topic was published in MONITOR, the Montenegrin and broader public knew almost nothing about this. Both airports have been operating as part of JAT since back in 1971, when it was the national air carrier. The Podgorica airport was transferred to JAT in '71 in the simplest

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

manner, by referendum of the employees!? The land it occupies is owned by the Army, which also built the runway. And all the airport buildings, large and small, part of the apron, and the rest of the infrastructure belonged at that time to the Titograd Opstina Assembly [SO] and to the Federal Civil Aviation Administration [SUCVP].

The Tivat Airport was built in 1971. The Tivat SO at that time pooled the funds of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and the SUCVP to build the runway and airport buildings for arriving and departing passengers. JAT soon came forward to manage the job, and the Tivat SO transferred the investors' rights and the funds collected under a contract. By putting what it received and some of its own funds in a time deposit in Investbanka in Titograd, JAT was able to obtain more borrowed money, and it completed only part of the construction. After the earthquake in Montenegro in 1979, funds from the entire Yugoslav community intended for reconstruction were used to build the present version of the asphalt runway, and the apron, other infrastructure, and equipment were expanded. JAT is today subject to the charge that it invested little or almost nothing in the further renewal and modernization of the airports in Montenegro, which it has been using for more than 25 years.

In the new state, the FRY, the national air carrier becomes a firm of the Republic of Serbia on the basis of the Republic Law on Establishment of the Public Enterprise for Air Transportation, adopted in February '92. The decree establishing the public air transportation firm, which was adopted by the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia in its first extraordinary session in February '92, was signed by President Slobodan Milosevic. It transformed JAT into a public firm of the Republic of Serbia, and all its property, 30 planes, all the airports in the country, office buildings, and the like, became the property of Serbia. This was confirmed again in the Law on Property of the Republic of Serbia, which dates from December '95, under which not only property in common use like forests, water, roads, and so on, but all those resources acquired by the public services and public firms, which is what JAT is now, also belong to the state. Thus by a simple enactment of the Assembly of Serbia, the property of Montenegro, facilities of exceptional strategic and economic importance, the Podgorica and Tivat airports, passed to its ownership and became its state property!?

Along with the activities to transform JAT and to take permanent possession of the Montenegrin airports, during '92 there were purges of personnel in JAT subdivisions in Montenegro. Everyone thought to disagree with this kind of policy of its management was removed from management positions in various ways. Key positions in air transportation in Montenegro were taken at several levels by tried and true personnel who would defend Serbian interests in Montenegro and unselfishly defend Montenegrin property against the state of Montenegro. In the role of representatives of JAT and the Serbian Government, during the past year they have brought foreign exchange from Belgrade in suitcases to purchase the land on which the Tivat airport is built from the former owners at a price of 20 German marks per square meter. It is not known, however, whether JAT has been entered on that basis as the new owner of the long-ago-nationalized land in the land records of the opstina court in Kotor.

Aside from losing the right to use airports on its own territory, Montenegro has also lost the right to a portion of the property of the former national air carrier in which all the republics invested. It is of interest to point out that the republics of the former Yugoslavia are demanding a portion of uncollected revenues from customs duties and other import charges used to buy JAT planes on the basis of their joint investment in JAT. JAT, that is, imported airplanes without paying those obligations, which was detrimental to the federal treasury, and thereby also the republic treasury, and this is now the subject of a demand.

All of this put Montenegro in a dependent position, because it could neither influence nor control air traffic in its own state. It could not organize it according to the needs of its own economy and its own public. JAT holds a monopoly in the sky and on the ground in the federal state, and plans domestic and international passenger traffic to meet its own needs, which, as a rule, do not coincide with the needs of Montenegro. This is felt most keenly by its public, which for long years now has put up with complete isolation and neglect of the capital of the republic with respect to air connections with the world in a fast, safe, comfortable, and modern way.

For a long time, JAT has not been flying the Montenegrins, but "taking them for a ride" from Podgorica to Belgrade and back, it was said in the stormy discussion on this topic in the assembly of the Montenegrin airline held recently in Podgorica.

In this whole story about airports, we should not forget the important military security aspect. In modern warfare, almost all invasions begin through airports, and so who controls them and who manages them is very important!

Parallel to the alleged activities of the DPS, which is preparing to finally see to the property of the state it governs, the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

recently took an initiative for return of these airports to Montenegro.

It is not precluded that this is a coordinated action of the Liberal Alliance and the DPS. Dragan Ivancevic, deputy of the Liberal Alliance, has filed a petition with the Assembly of Montenegro to adopt in its next session a resolution on the need for urgent protection of the property and other interests of the republic in the air transportation sector, observing that the Republic of Serbia has in a completely irregular and unlawful manner transformed and restructured ownership of the former enterprise JAT, appropriating the property of the Republic of Montenegro, namely the Podgorica and Tivat airports.

Deputy Ivancevic also recommends to the Government of Montenegro that "it urgently find mechanisms and ways of seeing that Serbia reimburses Montenegro for damages on the basis of what up to now has been the irregular and unlawful use and usurpation of property and property rights by the Republic of Serbia." Dragan Ivancevic also believes that Montenegro has the right to a portion of the property of the former enterprise JAT, as well as rights to which it should be entitled in the transformation of ownership of the national air carrier into a republic air carrier.

Montenegro: Party Official on Investigation of Kidnappings

96BA0222B Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 2 Mar 96 pp 8-10

[Interview with Dragisa Burzan, deputy of the Social Democratic Party and chairman of the Commission for Gathering Information on Hijacking in the Montenegrin parliament, by Velizar Brajovic; place and date not given: "Investigation Halted"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Even three years after the kidnapping of 19 passengers (18 Muslims and one Croat) from Train No. 671 in Strpci, the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro have not announced the results of the investigation. Faced with the silence of the authorities concerning the kidnapping, the opposition in the Montenegrin parliament has demanded that a parliamentary commission be created to gather information on the kidnapping of the passengers, which was done slightly more than two years ago.*

Since that time the commission has been trying persistently to achieve appropriate cooperation with government authorities and to obtain the powers of an investigatory commission. How successful it has been and what difficulties it has encountered were the first question put to Dr. Dragisa Burzan, chairman of the commission, who is a deputy of the SDP [Social Democratic Party] in the Montenegrin parliament.

[Burzan] There can be no discussion of any real and complete cooperation between the commission and government authorities. To be sure, there have been polite communications in this relationship, but this observation applies only to individual cases. Generally speaking, the answers which the commission has been getting from the government agencies contacted have arrived very late and have been extremely scanty with respect to content, even below the level of information presented to the public in the press. Many of those asked (petitioned) simply did not respond, although they are required to do so by law, except when a state secret is involved. One of these, for instance, is Mr. Zoran Lilic, who has made public statements concerning the kidnapping, has indicated the identity of one of the perpetrators, and has attributed responsibility for organizing it to the authorities in Pale. Much the same is true of the defense minister, from whom I expected the most specific information, because the Army has to monitor the formation and activity of armed formations along the border. Perhaps that is, in fact, a more professional attitude than the one taken by those who issued the scanty statements. That is, those who bear immense responsibility for the state of human rights, the minister for human rights, for example, but also nearly all those who hold the highest political office, were unable to tell the commission who is conducting the investigation, or they (perhaps) considered this unimportant. These are responses written a year and several months after the kidnapping.

The difficulties the commission has encountered are mainly insurmountable in view of the authority it has. Which is only to inform the public; the commission is not conducting an investigation; that is, it does not have that power and control over the appropriate legal and physical set of instruments. I, in fact, see this as the motive of the authorities when they formed the commission, which is referred to as a parliamentary commission to the foreign and domestic public, which, in fact, it is, but without the investigatory attribute necessary for it to work effectively. On two occasions, the Liberal Alliance has taken an initiative before the Montenegrin Assembly, and the commission has supported it, for the commission to be reclassified as an investigating commission, and this was, of course, rejected.

[Brajovic] You nevertheless did get some information about the conduct of an investigation. How do you evaluate the investigation on that basis?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Burzan] Yes, we did get some bits of information, but this was all official information that exists outside the archives of the secret services. In any case, thanks to the kindness of the public prosecutor of Serbia, I did examine all the existing investigatory documentation. I can say about the investigation what the commission adopted as its position in the last meeting, which is that the investigation was highly deficient in its conception, or actually there was no conception. As a matter of fact, so that people do not get the wrong impression that I am passing on the guilt to local authorities, I must say that I attribute full responsibility for the failure of the investigation to the top leadership of the states of Serbia and Montenegro because they turned it over to the local level, which objectively could not be up to such a complicated task.

[Brajovic] Do you have the impression that the authorities have obscured the facts which have been gathered and, in a way, sabotaged the effort to clear up the kidnapping?

[Burzan] I do not express impressions, nor do I comment on them. My position is that the government is giving the public a cloudy picture, as you have said, of its commitment to clearing up the kidnapping, and that I can prove.

[Brajovic] What specifically did the authorities or the police not want to check out in direct connection with clearing up the kidnapping?

[Burzan] I do not know whether it wanted to or not. However, the fact is that it did not check on a number of facts and testimony of witnesses. There were even direct indications of the identity of the kidnappers which were not followed through on. Not to mention that the list of the kidnapping victims is not complete; that is, at least one name can be added to the one offered to the public and to the commission on the basis of statements of witnesses. Perhaps it is not beside the point to add that the investigation has not been officially terminated, but for all practical purposes it has not been conducted since June 1993. It would be improper at this point to go into other details related to the investigatory documentation and lapses in the investigation, and I refrain from that, but there has been an abundance of them.

[Brajovic] There are those who say that during the kidnapping two trains passed the train in Strpci.

[Burzan] That is not precise enough. It is true that two other trains passed through Strpci while the station was occupied by the terrorists: the Prijepolje-Belgrade local and Train No. 670 between Bar and Belgrade. The first before the arrival of Train 671, and the second during the kidnapping.

[Brajovic] The kidnapping and occupation of the Strpci station were reported to the police in Uzice and also the dispatcher in Pozega, and this was done while the entire operation was under way. Is there information about that in the documentation on the investigation, and what would have happened if the police had reacted immediately?

[Burzan] The police were informed about the kidnapping while it was going on, approximately a few tenths of a minute after its execution began. What could it have done? Put that question to the experts, but, in my opinion, it could have done much that was useful and perhaps even saved someone.

[Brajovic] Does that mean, along with the fact that the conductor of the train entered the names of the passengers on the tickets and that testimony of witnesses indicates that the kidnappers spoke more the dialect from the region of Serbia and Montenegro than Bosnia, that the planners and kidnappers might be sought on this side of the Drina?

[Burzan] The fact that the conductor wrote the names on the tickets has not been clarified, although there are statements of witnesses to the effect that this is not correct. I think that the investigation had a duty to investigate this fully, and it was possible, at least to protect the names of the people who were doing their job in the train during the kidnapping. Where did the kidnappers come from? The investigation did not give an unambiguous answer to that question either. Testimony to the effect that Pale organized the kidnapping must be documented, regardless of political attitudes toward the authorities there.

[Brajovic] Milan Lukic was one of the kidnappers, according to statements of witnesses, and he was even arrested and held on that charge in pretrial custody, and he is today living in Visegrad.

[Burzan] Judging by the statement of Mr. Lilic, Milan Lukic is one of the perpetrators of the kidnapping. However, as I said a while ago, he personally has not presented to the commission evidence to support that assertion. It is up to the police to establish the whereabouts of possible kidnappers.

[Brajovic] At the last meeting of the commission there was talk about a statement having been made by a witness that one person was kidnapped in Strpci and released the next day and lived for a year and a half in Podgorica.

[Burzan] I have a statement to that effect. This is anyway something that the public was given earlier.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Brajovic] You say that the Montenegrin MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] has not reported all the data it gathered during the investigation. As you have said already, on the basis of witness testimony you sent them information identifying six of the kidnappers. Can you say something more about that for the public on the basis of your examination of the information on the investigation and the testimony you have?

[Burzan] No, I cannot comment on that more broadly; I can only say what I publicly reported to the commission, and that more or less coincides with the assertion contained in your question. Matters stand somewhat differently with the Montenegrin MUP. Allow me to explain. Operatives of the Montenegrin MUP, according to the minister at that time and also to the president of Montenegro, conducted an operational action in connection with the kidnapping. The content of that action was never reported to the commission. That would not be disturbing if I had not been reliably informed that there is information which has a bearing on the work of the commission.

[Brajovic] Aside from some of the results of the official investigation, you also have the results of your private investigation. What can you say about that?

[Burzan] I am aware of the results of the official investigation to date. Everything that I have gathered by my own involvement, and that is certainly inadequate and has to do with the commission's lack of investigatory power, has been passed on to those who have that power.

[Brajovic] What, finally, should be done to get the government to report the truth about the kidnapping?

[Burzan] We in Montenegro are doing, along those lines, the only thing we can do, and that is putting political pressure on the government. At the same time, I should point out the difference between guilt and responsibility. The government is generally responsible for the failure to conduct an appropriate investigation. It is up to others to sort through the facts and personalize that responsibility. I personally do not have that competence and duty, but from the position of a deputy I associate it with the presidential level and the parliament, and I will continue to address criticism to them.

The times have changed considerably. Let us hope that conditions will soon be brought about in Bosnia for the kidnapping to be investigated. Many people will provide information in The Hague, and Belgrade is still under pressure of international institutions to respect human rights. All of this is not enough, but a final answer has to be obtained with respect to the fate of those kidnapped and the identity of the kidnappers. The hope of obtaining an answer is a hope that the time of fascism has come to an end. For our part, we will continue to demand that a parliamentary investigatory commission be formed, and we will continue to exert general political pressure in that direction. We will also be requesting access to the archives of the secret services.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication produced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

FBIS collects, translates, disseminates, and analyzes foreign open-source information on behalf of the U.S. Government. Its publications may contain copyrighted material. ***Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.***

— Bracketed indicators before the first sentence of each item describe the way in which the material was processed by FBIS.

— Headlines and all bracketed explanatory notes are supplied by FBIS.

— Personal and place names are rendered in accordance with the decisions of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as adapted by FBIS. Unverified names in radio and television material appear in parentheses and are spelled phonetically; words and phrases in parentheses preceded by a question mark are unclear in the original and deduced from context.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

U.S. Government Customers

For a list of FBIS products, to subscribe to an FBIS publication, or to indicate a change of address contact:

FBIS
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, DC 20013-2604
Telephone: (202) 338-6735
FAX: (703) 733-6042

Non-Government Customers

Subscriptions are available from the National Technical Information Service:

NTIS
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Telephone: (703) 487-4630
FAX: (703) 321-8547

New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.